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Positive Liberty in Public Finance: State 
Oversight of Local-Government Debt and the 
North Carolina Model 
ADAM C. PARKER* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines state oversight of local-government borrowing in the 
United States and focuses in depth on the North Carolina model.  The Article 
considers (1) structures requiring prior approval before debt is issued by 
local governments; (2) different forms of state-takeover and emergency-aid 
provisions in case of a local-government fiscal crisis; and (3) ongoing audit 
and monitoring functions.  Additionally, this Article discusses the history and 
structure of North Carolina’s Local Government Commission.  Finally, this 
Article argues that the Local Government Commission’s model of ongoing 
monitoring, approval, and takeover authority is the preferable model of state 
oversight, as long as its authorities are limited to ensuring sound local-
government debt practices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In his famous essay, Two Concepts of Liberty,1 English philosopher and 
political theorist Isaiah Berlin described his notion of two types of liberty: 
negative liberty and positive liberty.2  Negative liberty or “negative freedom” 
 
 1. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969). 
 2. Id. at 122, 131. 
2
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is the notion of being “free to the degree to which no man or body of men 
interferes with [an individual’s] activity,” or “not being interfered with by 
others.”3  Positive liberty is quite different, meaning “the wish on the part of 
the individual to be his own master,” or the wish “to be a subject, not an 
object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are [the 
individual’s] own, not by causes which affect [the individual], as it were, from 
outside.”4 
While Berlin’s dichotomous concepts were aimed at explaining an 
individual’s freedom in a societal and political theory context, these twin 
concepts analogize well to governments that wish to remain autonomous, but 
which operate within a reality affected by the actions of other governments.5 
The interrelated nature of local governments is particularly apparent 
within local-government debt financing and fiscal practices. Local governments 
sometimes design or engage in new forms of debt financing, which other units 
emulate in hope of facilitating community development.6  Local governments 
mimic one another’s best practices and strive to attain fiscal health.7 
 
 3. Id. at 122–23. 
 4. Id. at 131. 
 5. This is an imperfect analogy.  Another analogy that could be drawn is that this interplay 
between state and local governments is simply small-scale federalism.  See Paul E. Peterson & 
Daniel Nadler, Freedom to Fail: The Keystone of American Federalism, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 251, 
25354 (2012).  Similarly, my analogy is used with the understanding that Berlin has his critics.  
See, e.g., PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM 18 (Will Kymlicka et al. eds., 1999) (“I believe that the 
negative–positive distinction has served us ill in political thought.”).  However, taken in the 
context of a local government acting as a corporation, I would argue that regulation by a 
dominant government structure (such as a state or the federal government) lends itself well to 
Berlin’s twin concepts.  This analogy is meant only to demonstrate the balance that a state debt-
oversight agency must strike in regulating local governments and ensuring stable market 
conditions within the state. 
 6. There are many examples of the various types of local-government financing 
mechanisms that have gained widespread adoption.  See generally Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, 
Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay For” Model of Local Government, 56 
FLA. L. REV. 373 (2004) (describing how special assessments, business improvement districts, 
and other forms of financing have supplanted much of the revenue generation that was 
previously created by local property taxes). 
 7. See generally KARL NOLLENBERGER ET AL., ICMA, EVALUATING FINANCIAL 
CONDITION: A HANDBOOK FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT (4th ed. 2003) (providing local 
governments with advice and measurement tools to determine fiscal solvency); Ken W. Brown, 
The 10-Point Test of Financial Condition: Toward an Easy-to-Use Assessment Tool for Smaller 
Cities, GOV’T FIN. REV., Dec. 1993, at 21, 22, available at http://lgc.uwex.edu/Finance/ 
Inservices/2011/kenneth%20brown-Ten-point-test.pdf (describing ten key ratios for predicting 
fiscal solvency for a smaller city); William C. Rivenbark et al., Communicating Financial 
Condition to Elected Officials in Local Government, POPULAR GOV’T, Fall 2009, at 4, 5, http:// 
sogpubs.unc.edu//electronicversions/pg/pgfal09/article1.pdf (describing a fiscal-condition 
3
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Beyond sharing techniques for budgeting and borrowing, local 
governments are common participants in a broader marketplace of local-
government bonds.8 This means that one local government’s debt-
management practices may significantly impact perceptions of the local-
government bond market, affect the cost of debt that other local governments 
may obtain,9 and may also affect other local governments’ general access to 
credit (as was the case in Orange County, California, in the mid-1990s).10  The 
 
analysis tool developed by several professors that uses several ratios to determine a 
government’s fiscal condition and solvency, including a debt-service ratio). 
 8. For a discussion on financing capital projects in North Carolina, particularly the 
marketing of capital debt, see DAVID M. LAWRENCE, FINANCING CAPITAL PROJECTS IN NORTH 
CAROLINA §§ 500–509, at 119–50 (2d ed. 1994).  For a broad, nationally focused overview of 
each facet of the municipal-bond market, see NEIL O’HARA, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL 
BONDS (6th ed. 2012), which discusses basics, issuers, the primary and secondary markets, the 
investment market, credit analysis, interest rates, regulatory and disclosure requirements, and 
more exotic instruments, such as rate swaps.  Some believe that the municipal-bond market is 
more easily shaken than other debt markets because municipal bonds are traditionally viewed as 
a safe bet for investors (which is why, along with income-tax exemptions for earned interest, 
local governments can offer lower rates than are available on the private bond market).  See 
MICHAEL LEWIS, BOOMERANG 171–78 (2011) (providing a discussion of the local-government 
bond market’s concern over defaults). 
 9. For example, in Israel, a large group of local governments underwent a severe financial 
crisis; goods were not able to be financed and “[a]bout three quarters of the local governments 
suffered from deficits—most of them had deficits of over 30% of their annual budgets.”  Omer 
Kimhi, Chronicle of a Local Crisis Foretold—Lessons from Israel, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 679, 
680 (2012) [hereinafter Kimhi, Chronicle].  “[M]arkets view a local crisis not as an isolated 
event but rather as a warning sign for the condition of other localities.  If a state allows the 
default of one locality, other municipalities might suffer from similar problems and follow 
suit.”  Id. at 715 (footnote omitted).  This ultimately leads to an increase in the cost “of credit 
for all public issuers in the state, even for those issuers that have no direct connection with the 
city’s default.”  Id. (emphasis added). This pattern of increased cost of debt is borne out again 
and again, as the Moody’s rating service pointed out when Atlantic City was put under an 
emergency management team in January 2015—other local governments who were also 
struggling were viewed as a greater credit risk going forward.  See Andrew Coen, Moody’s: 
Atlantic City EM Negative for New Jersey Locals, BOND BUYER (Jan. 27, 2015, 3:02 PM), 
http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionalnews/moodys-atlantic-city-em-negative-for-new-
jersey-locals-1069903-1.html. 
  Our state debt system is also fairly unique compared to the rest of the world.  For 
example, only twenty-five of the world’s 193 countries are federalist systems; second, only two 
other countries, Canada and Switzerland, do not have federally guaranteed state debt.  Peterson 
& Nadler, supra note 5, at 25253. 
 10. Orange County, California, is viewed as the typical example, and studies point to the 
effects of Orange County’s default extending to other cities in California, to the state’s ability to 
issue its own debt, and even to the municipal-bond market.  See Dwight V. Denison, Did Bond 
Fund Investors Anticipate the Financial Crisis of Orange County?, MUN. FIN. J., Fall 2000, at 
24, 24–26; John M. Halstead et al., Orange County Bankruptcy: Financial Contagion in the 
Municipal Bond and Bank Equity Markets, 39 FIN. REV. 293, 313 (2004).  Orange County 
4
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extent of the impact caused by a default or other signals to the market is 
debatable,11 but some effect undoubtedly exists.12 
The interconnected nature of local governments in the local-government 
debt market analogizes conveniently with the concepts of negative and 
positive liberty.13  Local governments inevitably want the freedom to manage 
debt as they choose and to take on more debt service if they find a buyer; local 
governments want administrative flexibility that is “unobstructed by others.”14 
However, if local-government debt management is left completely 
 
engaged in “heavy borrowing and risky investments in its investment pool” before becoming 
the largest municipal bankruptcy at that time.  See Floyd Norris, Orange County’s Bankruptcy: 
The Overview; Orange County Crisis Jolts Bond Market, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 1994), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/08/business/orange-county-s-bankruptcy-the-overview-
orange-county-crisis-jolts-bond-market.html. Whether this phenomenon still holds true is up for 
debate, although a reclassification of general obligation bonds as “unsecured debt” would have 
a significant effect on the rates that a lender might seek.  See Karen Pierog & Tom Hals, Detroit 
Bankruptcy Bond Fight a Watershed for Municipal Market, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2014, 9:17 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/17/us-usa-detroit-bankruptcy-bonds-idUSBREA1G0O 
J20140217. 
 11. Bond Girl, Michael Lewis Falls for Meredith Whitney, While Getting the US Muni 
Market Totally Wrong, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 30, 2011, 12:17 PM), http://www.business 
insider.com /response-to-michael-lewis-vanity-fair-piece-2011-9 (opining that an increase in 
rates is not as dire among local governments in the United States as it may be with other 
sovereigns because “state and local governments are not dependent on short-term market access 
in the same way the US government and European sovereigns are,” and “[w]hen municipal rates 
increased, state and local governments simply stopped issuing bonds”).  Id.  Indeed, only .06% 
of general-purpose local governments have filed for bankruptcy since 2008.  See Bankrupt 
Cities, Municipalities List and Map, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/gov-data/ 
municipal-cities-counties-bankruptcies-and-defaults.html (last updated Nov. 7, 2014). 
 12. This effect on market stability is perhaps further affected by recent changes to the 
potential yields for state and local securities as compared to federal securities.  See Peterson & 
Nadler, supra note 5, at 266.  Peterson and Nadler discuss state bonds in the aftermath of 
financial crisis as follows: 
  In the United States, investors were willing to accept lower interest rates on state 
debt securities relative to US Treasuries due to their federal-tax-exempt status.  After 
the financial crisis, however, the yield on state bonds rose above that for comparable 
federal securities, as any tax advantages were overwhelmed by perceived increased 
risk.  Rates of return on state bonds before the financial shock trailed those for 
Treasury securities because federal taxes need not be paid on the returns from most 
state and municipal bonds.  But after the financial crisis, the spread between state and 
federal bonds turned from negative to positive, as the relative risk from state 
investments outweighed any tax advantages.  Moreover, the yield spread between 
state and federal bonds varied significantly from state to state, indicating that the 
market perceived greater default risk in certain states. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 13. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. 
 14. BERLIN, supra note 1, at 122. 
5
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unobstructed, there is the potential for harm to the individual unit, its citizens, 
and the broader market, if a government’s finances are mismanaged.15  As 
former Massachusetts Representative Barney Frank said, “[n]o State, no State 
legislators, no governor, can allow any one of its municipalities to default 
because then every other municipality would pay through the nose.  So that is 
why this is not just some charity here; this is self-defense.”16 
A policy solution exists to solve the problem of one government’s fiscal 
instability affecting another government’s ability to borrow at a lower rate: 
another actor can impose constraints on all local governments’ borrowing 
abilities to maintain a stable market.  However, to provide the positive liberty 
of stable and inexpensive government debt, there is an implicit tradeoff—
some of a local government’s ability to borrow will be curtailed to provide 
certainty to investors, issuers, and other parties in the market.17  This tension 
plays out not only in intrastate borrowing habits, but also in our federalist 
system.18 
State governments fill this role through various forms of local-
government debt oversight.19  One method of oversight involves an 
 
 15. See Kimhi, Chronicle, supra note 9, at 715 n.264, 716, 718 (discussing the “contagion 
effects” of municipal default).  Generally, default is perceived to cause wide-ranging harm to 
municipal debt markets.  See LAWRENCE, supra note 8, § 400, at 92 (“Default causes long-
lasting harm to the unit involved and if widespread, may affect the market for securities of 
creditworthy governments as well.  Therefore states have sought ways to prevent local 
governments from borrowing more than they can afford.”). 
 16. Municipal Bond Turmoil: Impact on Cities, Towns, and States: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 25 (2008) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman, H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs.). 
 17. See BERLIN, supra note 1, at 132 (noting in the individual’s context that while one may 
be “[his] own master,” one is also a “slave to nature” or to external forces). 
 18. See Peterson & Nadler, supra note 5, at 26970.  Peterson and Nadler define this sort 
of tension and the temptation that local governments often face as follows: 
  When sovereignty is divided, lower-tier governments are tempted to run debts 
that place themselves at grave risk of default in times of financial crisis.  And central 
governments, both to safeguard their international credit rating and to respond to 
internal political pressures, cannot resist providing the assistance necessary to 
safeguard bondholders and other creditors from loss.  Central governments do not 
offer a helping hand without at the same time asserting their authority, however.  If 
they rescue states and localities they will feel more than entitled to take preventative 
measures designed to preclude future defaults.  Irresponsibility at the state and local 
level thus undermines the dual sovereignty essential for the survival of competitive 
federalism.  Celebrated in theory as an efficient government of Herculean 
proportions, competitive federalism is but a ten-pound weakling in practice. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 19. Federal regulation of state and local financing is also robust.  See generally 1 JAMES A. 
CONIGLIO & M. DAVID GELFAND, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING §§ 9:1–
9:23, at 9-2 to -64 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing the role of federal securities laws within state- and 
6
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authorization of extraordinary measures to handle crises when they emerge, 
like in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,20 or the attempts to forestall bankruptcy in 
Detroit, Michigan.21  Some states establish “early warning systems” to 
monitor and alert the state to financially troubled local governments, which 
often prompts state intervention before a crisis like those in Orange County, 
Harrisburg, or Detroit can emerge.22  This auditing function requires local 
 
local-government debt financing).  Indeed, ongoing reporting requirements from the SEC have 
changed in recent years.  See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL 
SECURITIES MARKET (2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport 073112.pdf 
(noting several SEC recommendations regarding ongoing reporting requirements for municipal 
securities).  This Article focuses on the oversight mechanisms of local-government debt, 
although the same arguments could be made for a federal oversight system that parallels a 
system like North Carolina’s Local Government Commission. 
  The oversight role is also filled by states in their authorization of local-government 
debt.  Local governments do not have an inherent power to borrow; they receive that authority 
from the state.  2 CONIGLIO & GELFAND, supra, § 12:4, at 12-19.  States impose various 
restraints on the categories of debt, as well as on debt limits.  Id. at 12-19 to -20 (providing a list 
of various state-enabling statutes). 
 20. See Romy Varghese, Harrisburg Sets Sale of Incinerator That Drove Insolvency, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 25, 2013, 1:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-25/ 
harrisburg-to-sell-incinerator-that-drove-insolvency-next-week.html. 
 21. See Caitlin Devitt, Detroit Takeover Bodes Well for Investors, Muni Experts Say, BOND 
BUYER (Mar. 1, 2013, 4:08 PM), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/122_42/michigan-governor-
rick-snyder-state-takeover-of-detroit-good-for-investors-1049250-1.html (describing Michigan’s 
takeover of Detroit). 
  Florida also has a “financial emergency board,” which “oversee[s] the activities of the 
local government entity or the district school board,” and is triggered when a local government 
either fails to pay debts, to transfer taxes withheld on the income of employees, to make payroll, 
or to address operating deficits.  See FLA. STAT. § 218.503(3)(g)(1) (2014).  These receivership 
structures also have their critics. See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, Democratic 
Dissolution: Radical Experimentation in State Takeovers of Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 577, 578 (2012) (arguing that the changes to receivership statutes enacted in Rhode 
Island and Michigan do not address the underlying causes of fiscal stress in local governments, 
and that the statutes “enact a punishing cancelation of local democracy”). 
 22. See Philip Kloha et al., Someone to Watch Over Me: State Monitoring of Local Fiscal 
Conditions, 35 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 236, 237 (2005) (“[S]tates have also developed more 
proactive approaches in which they try to recognize problems and have mechanisms for dealing 
with them before they balloon into fiscal crises.”).  Ohio, for example, has such a monitoring 
program, which also has an auditing function.  See PUB. FIN. MGMT., STATE PROGRAMS FOR 
MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL RECOVERY: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2011) [hereinafter PFM WHITE PAPER], 
https://www.pfm.com/uploadedFiles/Content/Knowledge_Center/Whitepapers,_Articles,_ 
Commentary/Whitepapers/State%20Programs%20for%20Municipal%20Financial%20 
Recovery.pdf.  In Ohio: 
  [T]he State Auditor’s Office monitors local governments by providing them with 
ratio indicators to benchmark financial performance and identify fiscal distress.  The 
State Auditor collects financial data on local governments through the state’s 
Uniform Accounting Network (UAN).  The UAN is a very low cost accounting 
7
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governments to submit information to the state for review.23  Some states also 
review certain types of debt instruments and require state approval before 
issuing the debt.24  Some states have explicit control strategies for troubled 
local governments, through which the state will take over the entirety of the 
local government at varying degrees along the spectrum of fiscal emergency.25  
Some states blend these approaches.26  Others impose constitutional or 
statutory limitations on the type and amount of debt that local governments 
may incur, although local governments sometimes design creative ways to 
circumvent those limits.27  Some states choose a different course, like 
Alabama did when its legislature chose not to intervene in Jefferson County, 
thus allowing the county to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy.28 
 
software program provided to local governments.  If a municipality decides to use the 
program, it must agree to allow the State auditor to access and analyze its 
information.  More than 70 percent of Ohio’s local governments use the system.  The 
State Auditor uses the financial data to monitor their fiscal condition and may 
recommend that a municipality enter one of . . . three programs, based on the severity 
of financial distress. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 23. See, e.g., Online Audit Reports, MICH. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www.michigan.gov/ 
treasury/ 0,1607,7-121-1751_31038---,00.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (providing financial 
audits in an online repository). 
 24. For example, Connecticut does not allow for tax increment financing (TIF) bonds that 
are backed by sales taxes unless the TIF bonds are approved by a joint committee of the 
Connecticut General Assembly.  See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-285(f)(6) (2013) (including 
incremental sales, hotel, cabaret, dues, and admissions taxes for use in a TIF district).  
Connecticut also requires approval by its State Bond Commission before any type of TIF debt is 
issued.  See id. § 32-285(g)(2). 
 25. See PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 3–4 (discussing Massachusetts’s takeover of 
the cities of Chelsea and Springfield, and its replacement of provisions regarding labor contract 
negotiation). 
 26. See id. at 5–8 (discussing several states with multifaceted debt-approval mechanisms). 
 27. See Note, State Administrative Supervision of Local Government Debt: The North 
Carolina Model, 1972 DUKE L.J. 487, 48788; see also 1 CONIGLIO & GELFAND, supra note 19, 
§§ 11:1–11:6, at 11-3 to -20 (describing the historical basis for constitutional debt limits and 
current trends in debt limits in various states). 
 28. Bond Girl, The Incredible Story of the Jefferson County BankruptcyOne of the 
Greatest Financial Ripoffs of All Time, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 23, 2011, 8:33 AM), http:// 
www.businessinsider.com/the-incredible-story-of-the-jefferson-county-bankruptcy-one-of-the-
greatest-financial-ripoffs-of-all-time-2011-10 (“Unlike Harrisburg, where the state of 
Pennsylvania moved swiftly to intervene in the city’s financial situation, the state of Alabama 
has resisted providing any assistance to Jefferson County over the years.”).  This has also had a 
detrimental effect on borrowing for other Alabama local governments.  See Sarah Frier, 
Jefferson County Agony Means Higher Borrowing Costs for Alabama Taxpayers, BLOOMBERG 
(Aug. 22, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 2011-08-22/jefferson-county-
agony-means-higher-borrowing-costs-for-alabama-taxpayers.html. 
8
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One state’s structure is unique among the various types of state-oversight 
mechanisms, and it is also the debt structure that arguably exerts the most 
control over local governments’ autonomy regarding their debt-financing 
decisions.  That structure is North Carolina’s Local Government Commission 
(LGC).29 
The LGC has its roots in remedying Depression-era defaults on local-
government bonds, which were exceedingly high in North Carolina, even for 
an era when defaults were occurring nationwide.30  What makes the LGC 
unique is not only its blended approach to regulating debt financing, but also 
the extent and reach of its various tools for regulating local-government 
debt.31 
This Article makes two principal arguments.  First, it argues that the 
LGC’s demonstrated record of ensuring fiscal stability is proof positive that a 
regulatory body like the LGC can help local governments to avoid fiscal 
crises, and may help to quell the recent uptick in Chapter 9 bankruptcy filings 
going forward.32  While states often employ several individual oversight 
 
 29. See infra notes 198–240 and accompanying text (providing a general background of 
North Carolina’s LGC); see also Stephen C. Fehr, North Carolina Agency is Local Government 
Lifeline, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (June 6, 2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/ research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2012/06/06/north-carolina-agency-is-local-government-lifeline. 
 30. See LAWRENCE, supra note 8, § 400, at 92 (“In 1933, for example, with the Great 
Depression at its worst, 62 North Carolina counties, 152 cities and towns, and some 200 special 
districts were in default on the principal or the interest or both, of outstanding obligations.”). 
 31. See PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 4.  One report described the LGC’s approach 
as follows: 
  If needed, the Commission can negotiate with creditors to work out a plan for the 
municipality to repay its debts.  In addition, if a municipality cannot meet its debt 
obligations, the Commission may order the local government to raise taxes or other 
revenues in adequate amounts to make the necessary debt service payments.  At this 
stage, the Commission may review and approve a municipality’s annual budget, and 
the State Treasurer will benchmark the municipality’s finances to set its future 
budgetary goals. 
Id. 
 32. For a counterargument that local governments should wield “fiscal home rule,” see Joni 
Armstrong Coffey, The Case for Fiscal Home Rule, FLA. B.J., Apr. 1997, at 54, 54, in which the 
author argues that constitutional restrictions and state oversight have limited “local 
government’s natural creativity and responsiveness.”  Id.; see also Omer Kimhi, A Tale of Four 
CitiesModels of State Intervention in Distressed Localities Fiscal Affairs, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 
881, 887 (2012) [hereinafter Kimhi, Tale].  Kimhi states: 
  Perhaps the best example of such proactive state involvement can be found in 
North Carolina.  Pursuant to a general statute, North Carolina created a special state 
agency to supervise local government finances: the Local Government Commission 
(LGC).  The commission monitors local governments and ensures their financial 
stability.  When certain indicators are met, the commission creates a special board to 
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mechanisms and constitutional amendments,33 and although other factors may 
step in to prevent fiscal disasters,34 North Carolina involves its state regulatory 
agency with local governments at each step in the debt-issuing process to 
ensure a proactive approach.  In addition, the LGC retains the ability (through 
an ongoing, rather than emergency authorization) to compel a municipality to 
pay its debt service.35  This approach provides a degree of certainty to all 
parties in the market, keeping borrowing rates low and increasing access to 
credit markets for all of North Carolina’s local governments.36 
Second, this Article contends that the mission of the LGC is unique and 
should remain limited to ensuring that local governments maintain their fiscal 
health.  Examples of functions that are not suited for the LGC include the 
supervision of (1) economic-development incentives, (2) pension funds, and 
(3) school finance.  Specifically, these functions should not be administered 
by the LGC because they involve policy judgments, because an investment 
function is not well matched to the core mission of the LGC, or because the 
method of financing the activity makes it impossible for the LGC to exercise 
 
intervene in the financial affairs of the distressed municipality and help it rehabilitate 
its fiscal stability. 
Id.  Kimhi’s article also acknowledges the exceedingly difficult set of circumstances facing 
local governments today, pointing to the importance of improving outcomes for local 
governments.  Id. at 881.  Kimhi further states: 
  American cities are facing the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.  
Many cities have difficulties financing their expenses, and substantial deficits in local 
budgets are prevalent. 2011 was the fifth consecutive year in which local 
governments experienced a decline in revenues, and according to the National 
League of Cities, 57% of city financial officers report that their cities [are] less able 
to meet their fiscal needs compared to the previous year.  Property tax receipts are 
down, and localities face massive pension and infrastructure obligations. 
Id. at 882 (footnotes omitted).  See also Bankrupt Cities, supra note 11 (showing a map of 
municipal bankruptcy filings in the United States since 2000).  There have been thirty-eight 
filings under Chapter 9, although the filings were traditional units of government (three of those 
were dismissed).  Id.  The other filings were nontraditional units of government, such as 
water/sewer authorities.  Id. 
 33. See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.  In Indiana, the state constitution imposes a limit on 
the amount of debt that may be taken out by a local unit.  Indiana does not allow the amount of 
debt to be more than 2% of the total assessed value of a unit.  Id. 
 34. For example, New York usually passes special legislation when a local government is 
in distress, and then the state grants unique powers to a borrowing authority to alleviate the 
problem, as well as to an oversight board to help guide the local government out of its dire 
straits.  See PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 5. 
 35. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-36, -181 (2013) (providing the LGC with the authority to 
increase taxes and to remove officers who do not comply with the LGC’s directive, both for 
local governments and for water/sewer authorities). 
 36. See generally Fehr, supra note 29. 
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sufficient control needed to bring the unit back to fiscal health.37  This Article 
makes one final point about recent changes to the LGC’s issuing of guidelines 
and its method of adoption—namely that if a guideline is issued as a strict 
rule, the guideline should be encapsulated in the state’s administrative code or 
codified by statute. 
Analysis proceeds in four parts.  Part I surveys various states’ oversight 
mechanisms of local-government finance to demonstrate the different types 
and forms of state supervision, setting up an argument for the cohesive 
approach of the LGC.  Part II explores the history of the LGC that led to its 
creation in 1931, as well as the subsequent changes that resulted in today’s 
LGC structure.  Part III describes the current powers of the LGC, including 
the types of debt that require approval.  Part IV considers other expansions to 
LGC authority concerning water/sewer districts, private financing for local-
government infrastructure, economic-development projects, pension-fund 
oversight, and supervision of school districts.  Additionally, Part IV critiques 
the LGC’s recent trend of adopting “guidelines” without adopting regulations 
through the formal rulemaking process. 
I. A SURVEY OF OTHER STATES’ REGULATION OF LOCAL-GOVERNMENT 
FINANCE 
This Part includes brief summaries of various states’ approaches to local-
government debt oversight to highlight three common approaches that states 
take to oversee local-government debt.38  This consideration of various state 
 
 37. This argument relates to school finance in North Carolina.  Specifically, in North 
Carolina, school districts are not allowed to levy their own taxes, which unduly limits the 
LGC’s ability to take corrective action to bring a unit back to fiscal health.  See generally Lisa 
Lukasik, Deconstructing a Decade of Charter School Funding Litigation: An Argument for 
Reform, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1885, 1896 (2012).  Lukasik explained: 
  Unlike state funding, local funds do not travel directly to the receiving charter 
school from their source, typically a board of county commissioners.  Instead, local 
funding for all public schoolscharter schools and traditional public schoolsis 
provided to the local board of education.  Then, the charter school statute requires the 
local board of education to “transfer to the charter school an amount equal to the per 
pupil local current expense appropriation to the local school administrative unit for 
the fiscal year.” 
Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29H(b) (amended 2013)); see also Margaret Rose 
Westbrook, Comment, School Finance Litigation Comes to North Carolina, 73 N.C. L. REV. 
2123 (1995) (describing the effect of school-finance litigation in North Carolina). 
 38. Oversight and intervention are not the only strategies that can be used to prevent or 
mitigate the damages of municipal fiscal insolvency.  See generally Omer Kimhi, Reviving 
Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 636 (2008) 
[hereinafter Kimhi, Reviving Cities] (discussing three types of approaches to solving municipal 
fiscal crises: creditors’ remedies, the Bankruptcy Code, and state financial-oversight boards).  
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approaches lays the table for Part III, showing how the LGC’s authority 
compares with these various state-oversight mechanisms.  The first Section 
describes the methods by which statewide entities approve local-government 
debt.  The second Section describes various states’ use of emergency-takeover 
authority during fiscal crises.  The third Section discusses how other states 
oversee local-government debt through auditing and monitoring functions. 
A. Debt Approval39 
1.  Louisiana 
Like North Carolina, Louisiana experienced a large number of municipal 
defaults in the 1930s.40  This shared history likely pushed Louisiana to fashion 
a similar state-oversight authority in its state-approval agency, the Louisiana 
State Bond Commission (LSBC), which is part of the state’s Department of 
the Treasury.41  The LSBC was created in 1968 “to centralize and administer 
the incurring of state debt,” and was later expanded to include local units of 
government.42  These requirements are written into state statutes, but the 
LSBC’s approval requirement was written into the state constitution as well.43  
The LSBC also receives applications from local governments and other 
political subdivisions for the ability to levy taxes.44 
However, even with the LSBC as a state-oversight approval mechanism, 
Louisiana has not avoided all local financial difficulties.  For example, in 
1999, the Lower Cameron Parish Hospital Service District became the first—
and so far, the only—Louisiana municipality to file for Chapter 9 
bankruptcy.45  In response to the filing, the Louisiana legislature required 
 
This Article accepts Kimhi’s argument that the state financial-oversight board is the preferable 
approach, and then considers the various types against the LGC’s structure.  Id. 
 39. There are other meanings that could be given to the term “approval.”  For example, one 
treatise discusses approval by the attorney general of some states, as well as other forms of 
judicial validation that can be required for bonds.  See ROBERT S. AMDURSKY ET AL., MUNICIPAL 
DEBT FINANCE LAW §§ 2.7.1–.2, at 9296 (2d ed. 2013). 
 40. See Marc D. Joffe, Drivers of Municipal Bond Defaults During the Great Depression 
1617, 21 (Jan. 2013) (unpublished M.P.A. thesis, San Francisco State University), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189889. 
 41. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36:769, 36:802, 39:871 (2014). 
 42. State Bond Commission, LA. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.louisiana.gov/ 
Home%20Pages/BondCommission.aspx?@Filter=BC2012 (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). 
 43. LA. CONST. art. VII, pt. I, § 8, para. B (“No bonds or other obligations shall be issued or 
sold by the state, directly or through any state board, agency, or commission, or by any political 
subdivision of the state, unless prior written approval of the bond commission is obtained.”). 
 44. See State Bond Commission, supra note 42. 
 45. See Voluntary Petition, In re Lower Cameron Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist., No. 99-21290 
(Bankr. W.D. La. Nov. 18, 1999); see also Lauren M. Wolfe, Comment, The Next Financial 
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municipalities to receive approval from the LSBC before filing for 
bankruptcy.46  Further, after Hurricane Katrina, the chair of the LSBC 
provided assurance to ratings agencies and bond insurers that the state 
treasurer would “not vote to allow any municipality in the state to enter into 
bankruptcy.”47 
While Louisiana’s approach is similar to the LGC’s,48 a key difference 
between the LGC and the LSBC is that the auditing functions of the LSBC are 
provided by a separate agency, the Louisiana Legislative Auditor,49 which 
supports the LSBC, but is not housed in the same organizational structure.  
Further, the LSBC does not have the ability to dictate fiscal policy to insolvent 
governments; instead, the LSBC may attempt to prevent bankruptcies by 
insisting that a local government not file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy.50  This 
approach forces the local government’s hand to raise additional revenues or 
restructure its financial affairs.  However, an approach that provides direct 
state assistance might relieve some of the political pressures that the local 
governments face, and could also bring in additional expertise that might 
otherwise be lacking. 
2.  Nevada 
The State of Nevada requires all of its counties to establish a “debt 
management commission.”51  The Nevada Department of Taxation offers 
assistance to counties with populations of less than 47,500 to carry out the 
duties of the commission, otherwise leaving the larger counties to provide 
staffing and support to their respective debt-management commissions.52  The 
state requires debt-management plans and financial statements to be sent to 
the State Department of Taxation,53 and that notice is provided to relevant 
local governments that would be affected by a debt concern and by subsequent 
 
Hurricane?  Rethinking Municipal Bankruptcy in Louisiana, 72 LA. L. REV. 555, 556 n.6 (2012) 
(citing Mary Chris Jaklevic, Ex-CEO Pleads Guilty to Medicare Fraud: La. Hospital Exec 
Faces Five Years in Prison for Bilking Medicare out of $1.4 Million, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 
25, 2001, at 15; Mary Chris Jaklevic, Bankrupt But Open: La. Hospital That Owes HCFA 
Millions Wins Reprieve, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Oct. 16, 2000, at 50). 
 46. See Wolfe, supra note 45, at 556. 
 47. Id. at 575 (quoting BUREAU OF GOV’T RESEARCH & PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL 
OF LA., MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY IN PERSPECTIVE 8 (2006), http://www.bgr.org/files/reports/ 
MunicipalBankruptcy4-5-06.pdf). 
 48. See infra notes 28593 and accompanying text. 
 49. See Advisory Services, LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, http://www.lla.state.la.us/localgovernment 
/advisoryservices/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). 
 50. Wolfe, supra note 45, at 57273. 
 51. NEV. REV. STAT. § 350.0115 (2011). 
 52. Id. § 350.0125. 
 53. Id. § 350.013. 
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property tax increases.54  However, it seems duplicative to give a county, 
rather than the state, the ability to approve its own debt through a debt-
management commission.55  Given the makeup of the commissions, which 
consist mostly of elected officials, the debt-management commission seems 
more like a traditional elected board56 than an oversight mechanism by another 
level of government.57 
3.  New Jersey 
The State of New Jersey employs a robust observation and approval 
mechanism,58 but also shows the complicated interplay between “unfunded 
mandates” from state to local governments.59  Like North Carolina,60 New 
Jersey experienced many local-government defaults in the 1930s.61  Also like 
North Carolina, New Jersey requires local governments to submit their 
financial statements to the state office to ensure that the budget is balanced,62 
and that it complies with statutory debt limits.63  Moreover, the state is 
 
 54. Id. § 350.0135.  Provisions regarding notice requirements from local governments to 
state agencies are also fairly common.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 10-109 (2001); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 66.045 (West 2014); MO. REV. STAT. § 108.240 (2000). 
 55. NEV. REV. STAT. § 350.014 (“[T]he proposed incurrence or levy must receive the 
favorable vote of two-thirds of the members of the commission of each county in which the 
municipality is situated.”). 
 56. Id. § 350.0115. 
 57. For example, the Clark County Debt Management Commission is composed of three 
county commissioners, six members of municipal governing boards, and two citizens.  See 
Clark County Regional Debt Management Commission, CLARKCOUNTYNV.GOV, http://www. 
clarkcountynv.gov/depts/finance/Pages/RegionalDebtManagementCommission.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2014).  This is not necessarily problematic, but it seems to be a duplication of other 
governing boards—with the exception of the two members of the public.  Having an 
intergovernmental board, however, has the potential benefits of cooperation and coordination of 
debt across several localities. 
 58. STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, NEW JERSEY REPORT 46–47 (2012), http:// 
www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/2012-10-22-New-Jersey-Report-Final. 
pdf. 
 59. Id. at 46.  The idea that some of these mandates are pushed down from the state to the 
local governments is a valid cause for questioning the logic of allowing a state to control the 
fiscal affairs of a local government.  In some ways, the ability of a local government to have 
complete control over its own debt financing is couched in the concept of home rule.  See 
AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 39, § 2.2.2, at 6467. 
 60. See infra notes 198–240 and accompanying text. 
 61. STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, supra note 58, at 46. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 47 (noting debt limits of “3.5 percent of three year equalized valuation for 
municipalities; 2 percent for counties; and 4 percent for school districts”).  To exceed these 
statutory limits, a government must receive permission from the state’s Local Finance Board.  
Id. 
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required to maintain a “watch list” for localities that have not complied with 
state filing requirements, or those that receive state aid as a “distressed” 
municipality.64  If a locality is placed on this “watch list,” the local 
government is required to submit its budget each year for approval by the 
state.65 
Through its Local Finance Board, New Jersey may also assume control 
of a local government’s financial affairs.66  In recent years, the state has 
assumed control of four local units’ finances: Atlantic City, Irvington, Union 
City, and Asbury Park.67  Other oversight mechanisms include the Transitional 
Aid Program, which requires localities with structural issues to submit to state 
oversight in return for aid, as well as statutory debt thresholds, depending on 
the type of local government issuing the debt.68  Specifically, in the distressed-
communities program, the director of the New Jersey Department of 
Community Affairs declares that the local government is in significant 
financial distress, and the municipality enters into a “rehabilitation term,” 
under which a chief operating officer (appointed by the governor) assumes the 
powers of the local government.69 
New Jersey and North Carolina share several similarities, but a key 
difference is that for all of New Jersey’s robust mechanisms, there is no 
requirement for debt approval by the state like the one found in North 
Carolina.  The Transitional Aid Program requires the municipality to agree “to 
pursue structural budget reforms and adhere to state oversight requirements,” 
but it is voluntary and more of a quid pro quo—it asks local governments to 
cede some of their autonomy in return for state aid.70  With the LGC approach, 
approval of debt applies across the board to healthy and financially distressed 
governments.  While this may be an unnecessary procedural step for 
governments that are fiscally responsible, this step helps ensure that 
governments do not need to voluntarily submit to a program like New Jersey’s 
Transitional Aid Program, as the ongoing requirement for all debt to be 
approved helps keep local governments out of the fiscal straits that would 
necessitate entering the Transitional Aid Program.71 
 
 64. Id. at 46. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  These local-government units are no longer under the state’s control.  Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 47. 
 69. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27BBB-9(f) (West 2010 & Supp. 2014). 
 70. STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, supra note 58, at 47. 
 71. This Transitional Aid Program also has the issue of being reactive in that local 
governments are submitting to oversight after they have reached a point of fiscal distress.  
Atlantic City, for example, entered the program, but now faces even more challenges as its 
revenues from casinos decreased and its infrastructure costs increased after Hurricane Sandy.  
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4.  New York 
New York has a wide-ranging, blended approach to oversight of its local 
governments’ financial affairs,72 but there are significant differences between 
New York’s approach and North Carolina’s model.  The primary difference is 
that New York’s approval approach is reactive—the state enacts legislation 
granting the state approval authority to address crises as they occur.73  In these 
individual circumstances, the authorities that are created to oversee the local 
government are often given “power to approve or disapprove budgets and 
financial plans, issue debt, and impose a wage and hiring freeze.”74  New York 
also requires approval from its local finance boards before issuing debt,75 
similar to Nevada’s requirement of a local board’s approval. 
Within New York’s regulatory approach is a monitoring system for fiscal 
stress.76  Once a unit is evaluated, the unit is assigned a grade based on several 
ratios relating to financial indicators, as well as environmental indicators (such 
as property values, population, age, and other metrics).77  After making this 
assessment, the state comptroller will offer reviews of a unit’s budget, 
technical assistance, financial planning over several years, training, and other 
resources to help the unit gain competencies in administering its local 
budgets.78 
This system is fairly comprehensive, but it lacks the permanence of a 
compulsory takeover provision; instead, it enacts legislation in specific 
instances where default seems likely.  That said, there are several layers of 
oversight within the system, and it appears to be a well-run system of 
monitoring and providing assistance to financially distressed local 
governments. 
 
See Marc Joffe, Atlantic City Declines: Will It End in a Municipal Bond Default?, BITVORE 
(July 14, 2014), http://bitvore.com/2014/07/atlantic-city-declines-will-it-end-in-a-municipal-
bond-default/.  Perhaps earlier intervention would have mitigated the issues that Atlantic City 
now faces by limiting the amount of debt incurred by the city. 
 72. PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 5.  Note also that Connecticut has a similar 
structure in which it appoints a supervisory board on an ad hoc basis.  Id. at 5–6. 
 73. Id. at 5.  This is also the case in Massachusetts.  See infra notes 91–105 and 
accompanying text. 
 74. PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 5. 
 75. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 33.00 (McKinney 2012 & Supp. 2014). 
 76. See generally DIV. OF LOCAL GOV’T & SCH. ACCOUNTABILITY, OFFICE OF N.Y. STATE 
COMPTROLLER, FISCAL STRESS MONITORING SYSTEM 1, 6–7 (2014), https://osc.state.ny.us/ 
localgov/pubs/fiscalmonitoring/pdf/fiscalstressmonitoring.pdf (discussing the methodology 
used by the state comptroller to determine whether a local school district or a local government 
is in fiscal distress). 
 77. Id. at 3–8. 
 78. Id. at 12. 
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5.  Other States 
Some states simply require approval for certain types of debt.  For 
example, Connecticut employs statewide approval for tax increment financing 
by its state bond commission.79  Other states have statutory approval 
requirements as a litmus test for local governments to pass—both 
quantitatively and qualitatively.80  There are, however, limitations to using 
such statutory approvals, which has led a number of states to create other 
types of incentives to use state-run “bond banks” to place debt.81 
Allowing a local government to use a state-run debt-placement group is 
more of a voluntary approach; there is no explicit requirement that debt must 
be approved by a state agency, but the agency can coerce the local government 
with lower rates should it submit to the state bank’s restrictions.  Other states, 
like California, have had less formal oversight or power to control financially 
distressed local governments, arguably leading to a greater number of defaults 
and bankruptcies.82 
B. State Takeover Provisions for Emergencies83 
1.  Florida 
Generally, state takeover statutes responding to fiscal crises can be 
divided into two categories: (1) ad hoc responses to specific local-government 
crises, or (2) generally applicable statutes that are used to assist financially 
distressed local governments.84  Florida’s statute falls into the latter category, 
as Florida creates a generally applicable system that subjects a local 
government to review and oversight by the governor.85  The state auditor uses 
 
 79. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-285(g)(2) (2013). 
 80. See Note, supra note 27, at 492–93 (describing the process of marketing local-
government debt). 
 81. Id. at 494–95. 
 82. See PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 10. 
 83. A fantastic discussion of the many facets of emergency takeovers of troubled local 
governments can be found in Kimhi, Tale, supra note 32, at 883 (“Indeed, most local fiscal 
crises since the 1970s, like the ones in New York, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Yonkers, Miami, 
Princeville, Chelsea, and Pittsburg, were dealt with through the creation of state boards, rather 
than through the help of bankruptcy procedures.”). 
 84. See id. at 886–87.  The generally applicable financial-emergency statutes contain 
statutorily defined language that triggers takeover provisions.  See Kloha, supra note 22, at 
242–44 (discussing various factors considered by the states that employ the generally applicable 
emergency-takeover structures). 
 85. FLA. STAT. § 218.503 (2014).  The oversight and review is triggered if one of four 
conditions is met: 
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several different metrics to determine whether a local-government unit is in 
fiscal distress,86 and once the conditions for a financial emergency are met, the 
local government and the state work together to determine whether state 
assistance is needed to rectify the fiscal issues.87 
Getting to the current structure involved previous financial crises in 
prominent Florida cities, particularly Miami.  In the 1990s, Miami 
experienced a budget deficit of $68 million (20% of the city’s total budget).88  
However, at that time, rather than having the emergency-takeover powers, the 
state was merely acting as an advisory board and was openly mocked by 
Miami politicians.89  When the emergency board started to take a firmer stance 
with the city, the process sped up, and Miami’s bonds became investment 
grade again.90  Today, Florida’s system has many of the necessary features to 
address fiscal crises, but its troubled past also shows the delicate politics 
involved in a state’s regulation of local-government finances. 
 
 (a) Failure within the same fiscal year in which due to pay short-term loans or failure 
to make bond debt service or other long-term debt payments when due, as a result of 
a lack of funds. 
 (b) Failure to pay uncontested claims from creditors within 90 days after the claim is 
presented, as a result of a lack of funds. 
 (c) Failure to transfer at the appropriate time, due to lack of funds: 
 1.  Taxes withheld on the income of employees; or 
 2.  Employer and employee contributions for: 
a. Federal social security; or 
b. Any pension, retirement, or benefit plan of an employee. 
 (d) Failure for one pay period to pay, due to lack of funds: 
1.  Wages and salaries owed to employees; or 
2.  Retirement benefits owed to former employees. 
Id. (formatting altered). 
 86. Financial Condition Assessment Procedures, ST. FLA. AUDITOR GEN., http://www. 
myflorida.com/audgen/pages/fca_procedures.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2014) (including 
differing indicia of financial health, such as revenues divided by population). 
 87. FLA. STAT. § 218.503. 
 88. See Kimhi, Tale, supra note 32, at 894. 
 89. Id. at 894–95. 
 90. Id. at 896.  As Kimhi noted: 
  Without coercion from the state, it is likely that the city would have continued 
with its dubious financial practices.  If we know that such coercion is needed, 
however, it makes more sense to give the board adequate powers to begin with.  It is 
possible that had the Miami board been given stronger powers from the start, the two 
years of economic distress after the board’s creation would have been saved, and the 
city’s rehabilitation process would have been faster and easier. 
Id. 
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2.  Massachusetts 
The State of Massachusetts also takes over troubled municipalities, but 
does so on more of an ad hoc basis.  The Massachusetts model is sometimes 
called the “state receivership” or “takeover” model, in which a state “appoints 
a receiver for the locality and the receiver manages the locality instead of its 
elected officials.”91  Within this model, “[t]he receiver has complete control 
over local affairs, while the elected local officials are usually removed from 
office.”92  An example of this is the receivership that the City of Chelsea was 
placed under in the early 1990s due to a decrease in collected revenues and a 
lack of decrease in expenditures by the politically elected board of Chelsea.93  
To rectify Chelsea’s problems, the state legislature passed an act placing 
Chelsea in receivership, and the operations of the city were assumed by the 
state.94  The state receiver was then able to use this broad grant of authority to 
take drastic actions to repair the city’s finances, restoring Chelsea to fiscal 
health in six months.95 
Professor Omer Kimhi, one of the few legal scholars to write about 
municipal insolvency oversight authorities, argues that this model has serious 
drawbacks; namely that there are political-opposition problems and problems 
of the state exerting its interests at the expense of a locality’s interests.96  
Professor Kimhi’s analysis points to the importance of a local government’s 
ability to determine its own course.97  However, the case of Chelsea shows 
why this value should be subrogated for a time to ensure that surrounding 
municipalities can exercise self-determination of their own affairs, and to 
protect the interests of taxpayers and bondholders. 
To use Professor Kimhi’s example, Chelsea experienced an exodus of 
high-wage families and an influx of low-income residents in the 1970s.98  
During this time, Chelsea remained beholden to political groups that exerted 
influence over the politically elected governing board.99  Indeed, the political 
influence was so strong that the board chose “to lead the city into insolvency 
 
 91. Id. at 897. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 897–98. 
 94. Id. at 898–99; see also Act of Sept. 12, 1991, ch. 200, 1991 Mass. Acts 679 
(establishing a receivership for the City of Chelsea). 
 95. See Kimhi, Tale, supra note 32, at 899. 
 96. Id. at 900–01. 
 97. Cf. id. at 906 (“State intervention in fiscal crises is needed because states are in a better 
position than local governments to address both the socioeconomic and the political causes of 
the crisis.  The state is able to take actions that local officials are unable to take and its 
involvement provides the political backup to initiate a rehabilitation process.”). 
 98. Id. at 897. 
 99. Id. at 898. 
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rather than resist the unions’ demands by initiating reforms.”100  This scenario 
demonstrates precisely why state supervision of a locality is acutely necessary.  
The city may often remain flailing in the face of its financial burdens: 
encumbered by local politics, unable to cut expenses, and unwilling to raise 
taxes to meet its debt and operating burdens until it is too late.  Having a state 
agency step in to act as a neutral party that can restore balance to a locality’s 
books and to take the political pressure off of the local governing body seems 
to alleviate many of these structural problems that normally prohibit the local 
governing boards from taking the necessary actions to correct their budgetary 
imbalances. 
This is not to say that there are no critiques of Massachusetts’s system.  
Kimhi’s point is taken that the appointed receiver in Massachusetts was a 
political operative,101 but a state could easily use an administrative 
appointment or form a bipartisan committee to ensure that a competent 
manager is put in place.  A second criticism is that Massachusetts’s system 
requires the legislature to take action by passing legislation to create a 
receivership in each individual circumstance.102  Chelsea is not the only 
instance where a receivership has been appointed in Massachusetts; more 
recently, Springfield, a city with a population above 150,000, was placed 
under receivership.103  Again, the receivership model worked well, changing a 
$41 million deficit in fiscal year 2005 to a $40 million fund balance in fiscal 
year 2009.104  Still, using the receivership model was an ad hoc decision that 
required legislative action.  Without protocols and metrics that automatically 
place a town in receivership, the debt market is left with the uncertainty of 
whether Massachusetts will place another town under receivership in the 
future, and if so, under what circumstances.105 
 
 100. Id. (citing Ed Cyr, Thoughts on the Chelsea Receivership, GOV’T FIN. REV., Aug. 1993, 
at 23). 
 101. See Chelsea City Managers After Receivership, OLGP.NET, https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20121019170449/http://olgp.net/chs/mayors/manager/manager.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 
2014) (describing James Carlin’s background, including the fact that he was previously 
appointed by Governor Edward King to serve as the Commissioner of Commerce before he was 
appointed as Chelsea’s receiver in 1991). 
 102. PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 3–4. 
 103. Id. at 3. 
 104. Id. at 4. 
 105. Id. 
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3.  Indiana 
One of Indiana’s provisions to address fiscal emergencies relates to 
constitutional restrictions concerning property tax receipts.106  Indiana 
operates under the Distressed Unit Appeals Board (DUAB),107 which receives 
requests from local governments that expect to have reductions in received 
property taxes of 5% or more resulting from restrictions that were put in place 
in 2008.108  However, Indiana also passed constitutional amendments to 
restrict property taxes to a certain percentage,109 meaning that distressed units 
will have to seek other means of collecting funds to meet revenue gaps.110 
In the wake of these constitutional amendments, Indiana broadened the 
powers of the DUAB, specifically requiring that an emergency manager be 
appointed if a local government is found to be a “distressed political 
subdivision.”111  The emergency manager is allowed to exercise the authority 
and responsibility of the local government’s governing board, review the 
budget, review the salaries of the local-government employees, conduct an 
audit, create a financial plan for the unit, renegotiate labor contracts, and many 
other powers to correct the fiscal issues that might occur within a unit.112  In 
other words, Indiana allows the state’s emergency managers to exercise broad 
powers in times of financial crisis. 
Perhaps most interesting about this model is that appointment of an 
emergency manager is mandatory after the DUAB determines that a political 
subdivision is a distressed entity.113  The statute that defines “distressed 
entity” also has several triggering events laid down for the appointment of the 
emergency manager—for example, if the subdivision has a deficit of 8% of its 
revenues (i.e., a negative fund balance of 8%).114  This is perhaps clearer than 
the LGC’s guidelines, which are not set forth by statute, but instead are 
 
 106. 1 CONIGLIO & GELFAND, supra note 19, § 11:4, at 11-14 to -17 (discussing diverse 
states’ constitutional limits on property taxes as a percentage of total value). 
 107. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-20.3-4 (2010). 
 108. PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 7. 
 109. Id. 
 110. For a discussion of alternative forms of collecting revenues beyond traditional property 
tax, see generally Reynolds, supra note 6, in which the author reviews special assessments and 
assorted forms of revenue-producing mechanisms used by local governments in instances where 
property tax caps are set by a state’s constitution. 
 111. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-20.3-7.5. 
 112. Id. § 6-1.1-20.3-8.5. 
 113. Id. § 6-1.1-20.3-7.5. 
 114. Id. § 6-1.1-20.3-6.5. 
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determined by the agency in a somewhat informal method.115  Placing these 
items in statutes may reduce flexibility and administrative discretion, but may 
also be welcomed by the local governments as a clear expectation of what 
precisely would lead to their loss of fiscal autonomy to state oversight.  
Indiana’s approach also has advantages to the methods employed by 
Massachusetts in that there is an existing standing committee ready to handle 
financial concerns, and the state does not have to wait on specific legislative 
actions every time there is a financial crisis. 
The approach is not as proactive as the LGC’s method because it does 
not require a certain level of positive fund balance before debt is issued (as the 
LGC does); it provides definitions of a unit that has entered a situation of 
fiscal distress rather than preventing the unit from incurring debts that will 
lead to that scenario.116  The Indiana Department of Local Government 
Finance does review the indebtedness of school districts to ensure that their 
appropriations are sufficient to service their incurred debt.117  The Department 
of Local Government Finance also approves and sets property tax rates for all 
political subdivisions within the state.118  This power to set property rates even 
when a unit is not in fiscal distress adds a state-oversight component of local-
government finance not seen in many other states, but further requirements on 
the financial conditions of units before they incur additional debts would 
provide additional stability.  There is also a robust staff of state employees 
charged with ensuring compliance with budgetary creation and data analysis 
of local governments in Indiana.119 
 
 115. See infra notes 241–96 and accompanying text.  This is not to say that the LGC does 
not have reasons for its fund-balance requirements or other policies, but rather that they are not 
put into regulatory or statutory form. 
 116. There are some types of debt that are subject to the constitutional limitations, and some 
that are not.  See Erin Blasko, Officials: Local Government Debt Under Control, S. BEND TRIB. 
(Aug. 3, 2011), http://articles.southbendtribune.com/2011-08-03/news/29848831_1_debt-limit-
local-government-debt-borrowing-limit.  For example, debt incurred by redevelopment agencies 
or the parks department does not count toward the constitutional limit of 2%.  Id. 
 117. IND. CODE § 20-48-1-11 (2010); see also id. § 20-46-7-14 (forbidding the Indiana 
Department of Local Government Finance from approving bonds that fail to provide for 
principal payments in some amount, and certain other financial arrangements). 
 118. Id. § 6-1.1-17-16; see also id. § 6-1.1-17-8. 
 119. See Department of Local Government Finance: About Us, IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov/ 
dlgf/2337.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2014). 
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4.  Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania recently enacted significant modifications to its structure of 
local-government debt oversight on October 31, 2014.120  Under the modified 
version of Pennsylvania’s law, the previously existing four types of state-
oversight programs designed to help local governments avoid and mitigate 
fiscal problems remain: the Early Intervention Program,121 Act 47,122 
intergovernmental authorities,123 and state receivership.124  The 2014 
legislation adds some new wrinkles to the state’s ongoing oversight of its local 
governments that are experiencing fiscal distress, including a fixed time limit 
that a local government can remain in the Act 47 program, as well as new 
procedures that allow for disincorporation of local governments that cannot 
attain fiscal solvency. 
The Early Intervention Program (EIP) is a proactive program designed 
“to establish short-term and long-term financial and managerial objectives that 
strengthen the fiscal capacity of Pennsylvania’s county and municipal 
governments along with the integration of long term community and economic 
development strategies that strengthen the local government’s tax base.”125  
The EIP was formally codified in statute by the 2014 legislation.126 
The EIP is similar to North Carolina’s LGC in that it helps to pair 
Pennsylvania local-government units with advisors before a crisis occurs.  A 
 
 120. See Municipalities Financial Recovery Act of 2014, No. 199 (Oct. 31, 2014) (amending 
scattered sections of 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.101–.501 (West 2014)), available at 
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/CH/Public/ucons_pivot_pge.cfm?session=2014&se 
ssion_ind=0&act_nbr=0199.&pl_nbr=0000. 
 121. See generally PA. DEP’T CMTY. & ECON. DEV., EARLY INTERVENTION PROGRAM 
GUIDELINES (2004), http://dev.pelcentral.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/early_intervention_ 
program_guidelines-04.pdf (discussing the program in detail, as well as the different financial 
assessment steps).  The EIP is now codified in statute.  See PA. HOUSE COMM. ON 
APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL NOTE ON HOUSE BILL 1773, at 1 (2014), available at http://www.legis. 
state.pa.us/WU01/LI/BI/FN/2013/0/HB1773P4312.pdf. 
 122. Municipalities Financial Recovery Act of 1987, No. 47, 1987 Pa. Laws 246 (codified as 
amended at 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 11701.101–.501). 
 123. PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 8–9. 
 124. Id. 
 125. PA. DEP’T CMTY. & ECON. DEV., supra note 121, at 1.  The 2014 legislation adds seven 
explicit objectives, including (1) providing assistance to municipalities in planning and 
addressing their financial difficulties, (2) engaging in a management review, (3) strengthening 
local governments’ capacities for financial planning, (4) implementing a multiyear revenue and 
expenditure trend analysis, (5) promoting multiple jurisdiction regional planning, (6) supporting 
a municipality’s adoption of best management and efficiency practices, and (7) furthering the 
“integration of sound community and economic development strategies to encourage” economic 
development and tax base growth.  53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.102-A. 
 126. See FISCAL NOTE ON HOUSE BILL 1773, supra note 121, at 1. 
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difference between the EIP and the LGC is that the EIP’s assistance is not 
automatically triggered—local governments must apply for assistance from 
the state to hire independent consultants for creating solutions to the local 
government’s fiscal problems.127  There is also no debt-approval component—
the EIP simply helps units with their planning and management rather than 
requiring the steps be implemented. 
The 2014 legislation also modified the EIP to include authorization for 
the Governor’s Center for Local Government Services (GCLGS) to offer 
grants up to $200,000 (with a required match) in the initial fiscal year to 
implement the goals of the EIP.128  The grants provided by GCLGS are meant 
to implement programs that serve the purposes of the EIP, such as 
implementing financial forecasting modeling in a local government.129  The 
2014 legislation also authorized the Pennsylvania Department of Community 
and Economic Development (DCED) to recommend that municipalities enter 
into the EIP, although it did not grant the DCED the authority to require entry 
into the program.130 
Pennsylvania passed legislation in 1987 known as Act 47 to provide for a 
designation of certain cities as fiscally distressed.131  Act 47 includes a portion 
relating to “municipal financial distress,” which lists criteria for determining 
the financial stability of Pennsylvania local governments.132  If the criteria are 
met, then the DCED appoints a coordinator (who is not a member of elective 
 
 127. PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 8; see also 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.102-
A. 
 128. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 11701.103-A, .104-A.  The matching amount from the 
local government is presumed to be a 50% match of the total amount provided by the GCLGS, 
and can be in-kind, although officials from the GCLGS may reduce the required match to a 
minimum of 10%.  See id. § 11701.104-A(b). 
 129. See id. § 11701.104-A(c). 
 130. See id. § 11701.121(b). 
 131. Municipalities Financial Recovery Act of 1987, No. 47, 1987 Pa. Laws 246; see also 
Kate Giammarise, Sweeping Changes to Act 47 Proposed in Harrisburg, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Aug. 31, 2014), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/2014/08/31/Sweeping-changes-
to-Act-47-proposed-in-Harrisburg-Pennsylvania/stories/201408220165. 
 132. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.201.  If any of the criteria are met, the Pennsylvania 
Department of Community and Economic Development may begin the planning process.  Id.  
Some of the criteria include, for example, the municipality maintains a deficit over a three-year 
period, with a deficit of 1% or more in each of the previous fiscal years; the municipality’s 
expenditures exceed its revenues for a period of three years or more; the municipality has 
missed a payroll for thirty days; the municipality has accumulated and operated for each of two 
successive years a deficit equal to 5% or more of its revenues; or the municipality has filed a 
Chapter 9 municipal debt adjustment plan.  Id. §§ 11701.201(1), (2), (4), (7), (10).  The list 
contains a total of eleven criteria. 
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office)133 and undertakes a planning process to help the unit cure the fiscal 
issues that it faces.134 
The DCED’s plan may be accepted or rejected by the local unit, although 
the local unit is required to make a separate plan that the DCED accepts if the 
unit rejects the initial DCED plan.135  If no plan is adopted at all, then the state 
may withhold funds from the local government.136  However, if a plan is 
adopted, the adopting local government is given priority access to state-
assistance grants over other municipalities in distress, waivers of some state 
regulatory requirements, and access to new revenue streams, such as a local-
services tax.137  Another incentive for local governments to adopt such a plan 
is that the coordinator can set maximum thresholds for future collective 
bargaining agreements, which would improve the local government’s 
bargaining position with its labor unions and help the local government 
control costs.138  The 2014 legislation also added a provision allowing the 
secretary of DCED to request a declaration of financial emergency from the 
governor if the distressed municipality adopts no plan.139 
Unfortunately, these plans do not always work as expected.  If a city is 
insolvent or is projected to be insolvent within 180 days, is unable to provide 
vital and necessary services, fails to adopt the coordinator’s plan, or does not 
adopt an alternative plan accepted by the DCED, a state of fiscal emergency 
can be declared by the governor.140  This leads to the establishment of a 
receivership for the city,141 as well as the enactment of a “Recovery Plan.”142  
Once a city is under receivership, the governor and the appointed receiver 
have full control of the locality and may renegotiate contracts and confine 
wages as needed (without dissolving labor agreements entirely).143 
Adding to Pennsylvania’s complexity is that Philadelphia and Pittsburgh 
were put under the oversight auspices of separate “Intergovernmental 
Authorities,” which have limited authority over these cities.144 The 
 
 133. Id. §§ 11701.221, .224. 
 134. Id. § 11701.121. 
 135. Id. § 11701.246. 
 136. Id. §§ 11701.248, .251, .264. 
 137. Id. §§ 11701.281, .282. 
 138. Id. § 11701.252. 
 139. See id. § 11701.248. 
 140. Id. § 11701.602. 
 141. Id. § 11701.702. 
 142. Id. § 11701.703. 
 143. Id. § 11701.706; PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 9. 
 144. PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 9.  Note also the distinction made by the 
legislation in its title: Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation Authority Act for Cities of 
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Philadelphia authority, the Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation 
Authority (PICA), comprises a five-member voting board (and two additional 
nonvoting members); all voting members are political appointees.145  Initially, 
the PICA board had the authority to issue bonds,146 but this authority has now 
lapsed.147  The PICA board retains the authority to approve all five-year plans 
until all of the debt issued under the current and prior board is repaid.148  The 
Intergovernmental Cooperation Agreement (Pittsburgh’s agreement) has 
similar requirements for the ICA in how it approves of Pittsburgh’s annual 
budget and five-year plan.  However, both the Intergovernmental Cooperation 
Authority and the PICA may not “nullify a non-compliant labor 
agreement.”149  The PICA system remains after the 2014 legislation.150 
Pennsylvania’s system shows why an LGC-style organization would be 
useful in this context.  The EIP, which is analogous to the LGC’s oversight of 
local government, appears to be a strong program of early detection.  
However, the EIP was, and still is, voluntary.  There are also additional ways 
to mitigate the financial problems that a municipality faces through Act 47 
provisions, but those methods only become available after the unit has already 
reached a point of fiscal instability.  Further, the subsidies provided by Act 47 
sometimes lasted for decades, which seemed to create a dependency on its 
features in some cases, rather than getting units back to fiscal solvency 
quickly.151  In addition, authorities were established for the state’s two largest 
cities, but each of those entities had its own problems associated with being 
composed of appointed officials from the state legislature with relatively little 
authority to do anything beyond approving the plans proposed by the local 
government.152  In short, Pennsylvania’s system has several different state 
oversight programs.  Coordinating these services within one organization 
 
the First Class.  See Act of June 5, 1991, No. 6, 1991 Pa. Laws 9 (codified at 31A PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 12720.101–.709). 
 145. See 31A PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 12720.202 (noting that the two nonvoting ex officio 
members are the Secretary of the Budget of the Commonwealth and the Director of Finance for 
the City of Philadelphia). 
 146. Id. § 12720.301. 
 147. Id. § 12720.319 (“No bond shall be issued for the purpose of financing a capital project 
or a deficit, other than a cash flow deficit, on a date later than December 31, 1994.”). 
 148. Id. §§ 12720.210, .319; PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 9 (“PICA must continue 
to approve annual five year plans until all of the debt is repaid.”). 
 149. PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 9 & 12 n.36 (discussing Act 11, which was passed 
in 2004 to assist Pittsburgh with its financial hardships). 
 150. See FISCAL NOTE ON HOUSE BILL 1773, supra note 121, at 13 (excepting Philadelphia 
from the amendments). 
 151. See Giammarise, supra note 131 (noting that Clairton, Pennsylvania, and other 
Pennsylvania local governments have been under Act 47 designation for over twenty years). 
 152. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
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would likely be more efficient and would lead to better information-sharing, 
monitoring, and ultimately, more effective interventions during a fiscal crisis. 
To wit, despite these various programs existing for more than a decade, 
Pennsylvania’s unique approach enabled a near-default on $3.3 million in 
bonds by Harrisburg in 2010.153  Harrisburg and other cities likely reached a 
point of near-default for the simple fact that default was seen as an option.  
The mayor of Harrisburg even admitted to defaulting on bonds to preserve 
services,154 which shows that while these defaults may be a problem of 
adequate resource-allocation, they are likely “the consequence of an absence 
of political will.”155  While the mayor of Harrisburg made a valid point that a 
bond payment may not be as important on a micro level as something like 
police or fire services, on a macro level, the defaulting of a city may 
negatively affect the ability of surrounding localities to provide the very types 
of services that he wanted to preserve.  Harrisburg’s issues continued, and in 
2011, the city entered receivership after first attempting to enter into 
bankruptcy without state approval.156 
Pennsylvania’s story, like Harrisburg’s, has changed over the last two 
years.  In 2013, the “Harrisburg Strong Plan” was adopted.157  The plan 
allowed for the sale of the incinerator that was at the heart of many of the 
city’s financial troubles.158  Additionally, the Harrisburg Strong Plan allowed 
Harrisburg to create new revenue streams from partnerships with the state and 
with local economic development groups.159  Harrisburg has now exited 
 
 153. Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal 
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 282 (2012). 
 154. Id. (“To disrupt [services] because we can’t make a bond payment would just be 
unconscionable.  And as a leader I couldn’t do it . . . .” (quoting Romy Varghese, Harrisburg 
Surrender: Why Pennsylvania’s Capital Skipped Its Debt Payment, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2010, 
at C1 (statement of Harrisburg Mayor Linda Thompson))). 
 155. Id. at 283.  There are people who argue for federal intervention as well.  See id. at 308–
09. 
 156. Judah Bellin, Can Harrisburg Come Back?, CITY J. (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.city-
journal.org/2014/eon1014jb.html. 
 157. See Emily Previti, State Officials File ‘Harrisburg Strong Plan’ for Resolving City’s 
Debt, PATRIOT NEWS (Aug. 26, 2013, 11:33 PM), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/ 
2013/08/harrisburg_debt_plan_filed.html (“The plan begins by detailing the sale of the 
Harrisburg incinerator that’s become a monument to those destructive political and financial 
habits for which the city is infamous.”); see also Walker v. City of Harrisburg, No. 569 M.D. 
2011, slip op. at 6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Sept. 23, 2013), available at http://www.pacourts.us/assets 
/files/setting-651/file-3053.pdf?cb=8e8741 (confirming the Harrisburg Strong Plan). 
 158. See Walker, slip op. at 3. 
 159. See id. at 3–4; Previti, supra note 157. 
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receivership, and some have observed that elements of the Harrisburg Strong 
Plan have become part of the statewide Pennsylvania model of receivership.160 
Other changes have occurred in Pennsylvania as well.  One of the biggest 
changes is that time limits are now placed on a local government’s enjoyment 
of the Act 47 provisions.161  Now, municipalities that enter distressed status 
under Act 47 will have a five-year limit to this status.162  If a municipality is 
already in distressed status, the five-year period begins to run from the 
effective date of the municipality’s most recent recovery plan or amendment 
to its recovery plan.163  If the municipality’s current recovery plan is set to 
expire within one year or less of the effective date of the 2014 amendments, 
the municipality is granted a one-time automatic three-year extension.164 
Lastly, the amendments to Act 47 have created a somewhat radical new 
option: disincorporation of nonviable municipalities.165  This procedure 
requires the secretary of DCED to determine whether a municipality is 
viable.166  In making this determination, the secretary of DCED must find that 
(1) the municipality cannot provide essential services to its residents; (2) the 
municipality’s economy and tax base have collapsed, and all reasonable 
efforts to restore the economic health of the community have failed; and (3) 
the municipality cannot merge with a neighboring municipality or such a 
merger would not solve the unit’s issues.167 
After the secretary of DCED makes a finding of nonviability, one of two 
processes may initiate a disincorporation: (1) the municipality’s governing 
board may initiate a disincorporation proceeding itself within forty-five days 
of the secretary’s finding, or (2) a petition of 51% of the electorate who voted 
in the last gubernatorial election may be submitted to the court of common 
pleas within sixty days after the municipality’s governing body’s forty-five-
day window, if the governing body does not initiate proceedings on its own.168  
If neither the governing body of the municipality nor the majority petition are 
 
 160. See Pennsylvania Governor Corbett Announces Commonwealth Court Has Granted 
Application to Vacate Receivership for the City of Harrisburg; Rescinds Fiscal Emergency, PA. 
DEP’T CMTY. & ECON. DEV. (Feb. 26, 2014, 3:37 PM), http://www.newpa.com/newsroom/ 
governor-corbett-announces-commonwealth-court-has-granted-application-vacate-receivership-
for-city-h; see also William C. Rhodes et al., Act 47: Pennsylvania Says Enough Is Enough.  Or 
Is It?, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/ 
legalalerts/2014-10-31-act-47-pennsylvania-says-enough-is-enough-or-is-it.aspx. 
 161. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.254 (West 2014). 
 162. See id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. §§ 11701.431, .446. 
 166. See id. § 11701.431.1. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. § 11701.432. 
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filed, or if a reviewing court finds that the municipality should not be 
disincorporated, the secretary of DCED then determines whether the 
municipality should continue under a recovery plan, whether the municipality 
should be placed into receivership, whether the municipality’s distressed 
status should be terminated, or whether the municipality should initiate a 
bankruptcy proceeding.169 
After the court of common pleas or the secretary of DCED determines 
that disincorporation is appropriate, a service district administrator is 
appointed by the secretary of DCED and given broad powers to change the 
fiscal complexity of a municipality prior to final disincorporation of the 
municipality.170  The administrator may sell or convey municipal assets; repay 
debts, bonds, or other obligations; seek a writ of mandamus against the 
municipality to carry out a disincorporation; approve, disapprove, and 
negotiate contracts for services; identify essential services for residents; apply 
for grants; establish fees; and hire professionals to aid in her duties.171 
The administrator must put forth her essential-services plan within ninety 
days of being appointed.  This plan provides for necessary public services, 
emergency management, payment of debt obligations, and establishes the 
unincorporated service district that will replace the municipality.172  There is 
an initial plan, a notice and comment period, and then a final plan, which also 
has a notice period.173 
Prior to disincorporation, the municipality must pass a budget that funds 
the municipality’s obligations until the municipality is disincorporated.174  The 
municipality must also provide for the transfer and administration of 
municipal pension obligations to another private or public pension fund.175 
Once the municipality is disincorporated, the terms of the essential-
services plan end, the terms of the elected officials end, municipal ordinances 
are nullified, and the corporate powers of the municipality terminate.176  All 
remaining property of the municipality becomes property of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, held in trust until such a time that the 
unincorporated service district merges with another municipality or is 
 
 169. Id. § 11701.433.1. 
 170. Id. § 11701.434. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. § 11701.436. 
 173. Id. §§ 11701.437, .438. 
 174. Id. § 11701.435. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. § 11701.439.  However, the zoning ordinances that were in existence within the 
municipality are required to be adopted by the county where the municipal boundaries existed.  
Id. 
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reincorporated.177  The service district does not enjoy the powers of a 
traditional municipality, such as the taxing authority or the power to establish 
elected offices.178 
The effect of the 2014 amendments is to provide Pennsylvania 
municipalities with additional tools to help its financially distressed cities 
emerge from fiscal distress, and to set a time limit on remaining within a 
“fiscally distressed” status.  Both of these measures are positive steps. 
One possible further step remains for Pennsylvania, however: 
Pennsylvania could allow for an administrative agency to oversee all public-
debt issuances and require approval of all public debt prior to issuance.179  By 
monitoring and approving debt before a local government reaches the level of 
voluntarily entering the EIP, the local government might avoid the 
intervention altogether.  While an early intervention is thankfully still, by its 
definition, early in the process of a municipality experiencing fiscal stress, 
keeping local governments out of a fiscal area that requires intervention is a 
better outcome for all parties. 
C. State Auditing and Monitoring Functions 
To discuss some of the potential front-end monitoring solutions, this 
Section briefly considers the auditing procedures of Georgia, Michigan, and 
Ohio. 
1.  Georgia180 
In Georgia, the Department of Community Affairs has the task of 
conducting an annual review of local-government budgets and financial 
 
 177. Id. § 11701.441. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Pennsylvania already has constitutional provisions relating to debt limits.  See PA. 
CONST. art. IX, §§ 10, 12.  There is no limit set on debt that is approved by the electorate.  See 
53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8021.  Nonelectoral debt is subject to a “borrowing base” 
calculation.  See id. § 8022(a); see also Juita-Elena (Wie) Yusuf et al., State Fiscal Constraints 
on Local Government Borrowing: Effects on Scale and Cost, in HANDBOOK OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT FISCAL HEALTH 475, 479 (Helisse Levine et al. eds., 2013).  Philadelphia is not 
subject to the same debt limits as the rest of the state; instead, its debt limits are specifically set 
forth in Pennsylvania’s state constitution.  See PA. CONST. art. IX, § 12. 
 180. Interestingly, Georgia does not allow a municipality to file for bankruptcy; instead, the 
unit of government is dissolved, and all of its assets are transferred to the county where it is 
located.  GA. CODE ANN. § 36-68-1 (2012).  Georgia is one of only two states that prohibit 
municipal bankruptcy in its entirety.  The other state, Iowa, does have a filing exception for 
“insolvency caused by debt involuntarily incurred not covered by insurance proceeds.”  JAMES 
E. SPIOTTO, CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, PRIMER ON MUNICIPAL DEBT ADJUSTMENT D-2 (2012) 
(citing IA. CODE ANN. § 76.16A), available at http://www.afgi.org/resources/Bankruptcy_ 
Primer.pdf. 
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statements.181  Units that do not comply with generally accepted accounting 
principles are required to undergo an audit, losing their ability to receive state 
grant funds if they do not comply with the accounting requirement.182 
The Department of Community Affairs has other functions as well.  For 
example, the department administers several federal grants and assists with 
urban- and rural-development planning.183  Additionally, the department is 
tasked with overseeing local-government authorities (such as a business 
improvement district or a water/sewer authority as opposed to the actual local 
governments), which are required to register with the Department of 
Community Affairs.184 
On balance, Georgia’s decision to withhold state funds is a different 
strategy for ensuring local compliance.  Local governments depend greatly on 
state aid and resources—to deprive them of these financial lifelines is a great 
incentive to push local governments to improve deficient financial 
reporting.185 
2.  Michigan 
Perhaps in response to critics alleging a lack of accountability and 
oversight,186 Michigan enacted legislation in 2011 to improve its ability to 
 
 181. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-81-8. 
 182. Id. §§ 36-81-7, -8.1. 
 183. Id. § 50-8-3. 
 184. Id. § 36-80-16. 
 185. There are several noncompliant cities and twelve noncompliant counties.  See 
Memorandum from Greg S. Griffin, State Auditor of Georgia, to State Agency Heads (Sept. 19, 
2014), available at http://www.audits.ga.gov/NALGAD/Files/September_2014_ memo _with _ 
listing.pdf. 
 186. See Study: Crucial Information Lacking on Local Government Debt, MICH. ST. U. 
TODAY (Feb. 4, 2011), http://msutoday.msu.edu/news/2011/study-crucial-information-lacking-
on-local-government-debt/.  For example, one study concluded that “Michigan should create a 
better system for keeping tabs on the debt incurred by local governments—especially in these 
tough economic times.”  Id.  That conclusion came as a result of economist Eric Scorsone’s 
attempt to measure the health of Michigan’s municipal-bond market.  Id.  Scorsone “was unable 
to finish the job due to a lack of state-level information on the debt owed by local 
governments.”  Id.  As the study explained: 
  Through municipal bonds, Michigan’s 1,800 local governments borrow billions 
of dollars and pay off the debt largely through property tax revenue.  But this revenue 
has plummeted as home values have fallen, . . . “and the aftermath of its impact will 
continue in the public sector for some time to come.” 
Id. (quoting Scorsone).  Scorsone stated that “[m]uch of the local government revenue base is 
predicated on those home values,” and “these falling revenue streams are the foundation for 
much of the municipal bond repayment system.”  Id. 
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track data, and provided the measurements to the voters of the state.187  The 
new legislation requires local governments to take action if fiscal issues 
arise—an emergency-response function as highlighted above188—and also 
provides procedures for more-extensive financial reviews if, after an initial 
survey by a state auditor, the state determines there is a fiscal emergency.189 
Michigan’s reforms are wide-ranging and should not be viewed solely 
through the limited context of auditing functions.  Indeed, the reforms actually 
bring the state close to the types of authorization that the LGC enjoys in North 
Carolina, although there is a requirement that the audit is initiated by the local 
government, a petition of 5% of the locality’s voters, a creditor that was not 
paid for over six months, or the employee pension fund.190  This initiation 
requirement differs from the LGC, but the threshold needed to begin the 
process appears to be relatively low. 
While Michigan’s reforms are certainly helpful to bring local 
governments out of fiscal insolvency, some critics point to the political issues 
of allowing wholesale agency authority over local-government finance: 
specifically, some critics dislike the removal of “choice” by forcing the 
government to choose from four options, effectively curtailing the ability to 
file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy.191  This argument could certainly be levied 
toward the LGC, perhaps with greater acrimony, as the LGC’s authority is 
more far-reaching than Michigan’s. 
Ultimately, one would hope that the relationship between state and local 
governments is mutually beneficial.  Many view the LGC, which provides 
assistance in marketing debt for its localities, as a helpful partner for local 
 
 187. See Act of Mar. 16, 2011, No. 5, sec. 303, 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts xxix (codified as 
amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.2303 (2013)). 
 188. See Eric Scorsone, Frequently Asked Questions About the New Michigan Local 
Financial Emergency Law, MICH. ST. U. 2 (Jan. 2013), http://msue.anr.msu.edu/uploads/236/ 
25914/FAQ-WhyNewLawWasPassed.pdf.  Scorsone’s report lists “factors that may trigger a 
state financial review of a local government or school district,” including “[m]issed payroll or 
bond payments,” “[f]ailure to comply with a state-ordered deficit elimination plan,” “[v]iolation 
of local government debt or budgeting rules,” “[i]mposition of a court-ordered tax levy,” “[a] 
very low credit rating,” and “[a]ny other facts that, in the state treasurer’s estimation, may 
threaten the fiscal stability of the local government.”  Id. 
 189. Id. at 3. 
 190. See PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 7; see generally Scorsone, supra note 188 
(discussing the similarly structured legislation that passed after voters rejected the initial 
legislation). 
 191. A Comprehensive Look at Michigan’s New(est) Emergency Manager Law, Now with 
Stability and Choice!, ECLECTABLOG (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.eclectablog.com/ 2013/02/a-
comprehensive-look-at-michigans-newest-emergency-manager-law-now-with-stability-
choice.html. 
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governments.192  However, because the state agency dictates the policy of a 
local body and potentially limits that locality’s autonomy, there will always be 
a fundamental tension between state and local governments under such state-
led arrangements. 
3.  Ohio 
Ohio employs a fairly robust system of monitoring its local governments.  
Through the State Auditor’s Office, Ohio monitors its local governments and 
provides them with ratio indicators and benchmarks to assess financial 
stability.193  Ohio offers its local governments low-cost accounting software.  
However, if a locality chooses to use the software, the locality agrees to give 
the state free access to analyze its financial information.194 
The state auditor of Ohio uses the information gathered through the 
software to determine whether and how far localities fall into differing levels 
of fiscal distress. The first and least serious level of distress is “fiscal 
caution.”195  The second level, known as “fiscal watch,” may be requested by 
the governor or can be triggered by a number of statutory conditions.196  The 
most serious category is labeled “fiscal emergency” and occurs if expenses 
exceed revenues by one-sixth of the prior year’s revenues or through other 
triggering events.197 
D. Summary 
This Part provided a brief survey of other states’ practices to identify the 
types of state oversight of local-government finance. Several states have 
engaged in significant reforms to buttress the power of their local-government 
debt-monitoring authorities, yet as Parts II and III will show, other states do 
not place as much power in their institutions as North Carolina grants to the 
 
 192. K. Lee Carter, Jr., State Oversight of Local Government Finance, in STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA 71, 77–78 (Charles D. Liner ed., 2d ed. 1995). 
 193. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 118.05 (West Supp. 2014). 
 194. See PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 1–2; Uniform Accounting Network, 
OHIOAUDITOR.GOV, https://ohioauditor.gov/uan.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
 195. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 118.025 (providing fiscal-caution guidelines for local 
governments); id. § 3316.031 (West 2012) (providing fiscal-caution guidelines for school 
districts). 
 196. Id. §§ 118.021–.023 (West 2002 & Supp. 2014); PFM WHITE PAPER, supra note 22, at 
1–2.  As of 2011, three cities were under fiscal watch, and eleven cities had graduated from that 
status.  Id. at 2. 
 197. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 118.03 (West 2002).  In 2011, twenty-four municipalities were 
under the “fiscal emergency” status, and thirty-five had graduated from that status.  PFM WHITE 
PAPER, supra note 22, at 2. 
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LGC.  The remainder of this Article considers the history of the LGC, its 
powers, and possible or problematic extensions of LGC authority. 
II. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMISSION: A BRIEF HISTORY 
A. Events Leading to the Creation of North Carolina’s Local 
Government Commission 
The LGC has its origins in the overall restructuring of North Carolina’s 
county governments.  Counties began to assume more responsibility for roads, 
schools, maintenance of law and order, and operating the courts in the early 
1900s.198  To administer these and other functions of county government, 
different boards and commissions were created in the model of county school 
boards.199  This resulted in a decentralized system of government in which 
county boards raised funds for various governmental functions, and then 
turned over the funds to the respective boards to expend.200  Additionally, after 
the cessation of World War I, constituents began to request higher quality 
services, even if it meant paying additional taxes.201 
In early 1931, the total debt of all local-government units exceeded $350 
million, an increase from less than $50 million before World War I.202  This 
increase in debt was problematic for several reasons: bonds were issued 
haphazardly with little regard for maturity schedules, inadequate provisions 
were taken to address payments of principal, and the Depression’s 
accompanying decline in property values decreased local governments’ ability 
to repay their debt service.203  Further, North Carolina courts began to apply a 
liberal construction of article V, section 4, of the North Carolina 
constitution,204 which led local governments to take on a much greater load of 
debt.205  The state had little to no authority to regulate debt, and the State 
Sinking Fund Commission also lacked the power to handle bond defaults.206 
Several reports were issued that pointed to potential solutions to these 
looming problems, including reports from the North Carolina Association of 
 
 198. JOHN ALEXANDER MCMAHON, N.C. ASS’N CNTY. COMM’RS, THE NORTH CAROLINA 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMISSION 1 (1960), available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id 
=mdp.39015081948138;view=1up;seq=16. 
 199. Id. at 1–2. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 2. 
 202. Id. at 4. 
 203. Id. at 5–6. 
 204. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 4, cl. 2. 
 205. MCMAHON, supra note 198, at 5. 
 206. Id. at 6. 
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County Commissioners, the North Carolina Tax Commission, and the Institute 
for Government Research at the Brookings Institution.207  Generally, these 
reports pointed to the need for uniform practices, and for state oversight of 
debt issuance, management, and accounting.208 
B. Formation of the Local Government Commission 
When the General Assembly convened in 1931, it formed the LGC by 
passing the Local Government Act for the express purpose of reigning in the 
issuances of debt by local governments.209  The LGC originally consisted of 
nine members: the state auditor, the state treasurer, the commissioner of 
revenue, and six members appointed by the governor, one of whom was the 
director of local government.210  The LGC was given seven major tasks: 
 
1. approve all bonds and notes proposed for issuance by a local 
government; 
2. sell all bonds and notes; 
3. ensure the proper accounting of local governments’ funds; 
4. ensure local governments pay interest and principal 
promptly; 
5. provide for uniform accounting practices among local 
governments; 
6. supervise local audits of financial statements; and 
7. prevent the intermingling of public officers’ personal funds 
from the funds of governments.211 
 
Another feature of the Local Government Act was to make all cities, 
towns, and counties subject to these requirements and to LGC oversight.212  
 
 207. Id.  Particularly well known is the Brookings Institution report, which Governor Max 
Gardner solicited and which has been seen as the genesis of the LGC.  INST. FOR GOV’T 
RESEARCH, BROOKINGS INST., REPORT ON A SURVEY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA 301–02 (1930), available  
at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924014070506;view=1up;seq=5 (calling for the 
creation of the Department of Local Government Finance, complete with an accounting and 
debt administration function).  A second report summarized many of the actions taken 
thereafter.  See A. T. ALLEN ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., STATE CENTRALIZATION IN NORTH 
CAROLINA 80–115 (Paul V. Betters ed., 1932), available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/ 
pt?id=mdp.39015065170725;view=1up;seq=7. 
 208. See MCMAHON, supra note 198, at 6. 
 209. Id. at 7. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 8–9. 
 212. Id. at 9. 
35
Parker: Positive Liberty in Public Finance: State Oversight of Local-Gove
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015
142 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:107 
The LGC was also tasked with reviewing the qualifications of all individuals 
appointed as town accountants.213 
In 1933, there was a small reorganization of the LGC, which made the 
state treasurer the ex officio director of local government, and changed the 
membership composition to four ex officio members and five appointees of 
the governor.214  Two additional pieces of legislation in 1933 affected the 
LGC’s operations: the first allowed local governments to issue term bonds in 
the event of funding or refunding difficulties.  The term bonds were to provide 
needed flexibility in working out maturity schedules, and a separate provision 
allowed holders of 51% of the bonds of a unit of government one year after a 
default by the unit to demand that the LGC appoint a financial administrator 
of the local government unit via the consent of a superior court judge.215 
In 1935, the LGC was given authority to negotiate with creditors and 
with the unit of government if the government had been in default for six 
months.216  The LGC was also allowed to prepare a refunding plan, to approve 
a refunding plan suggested by the unit or its creditors, and to put the approved 
plan into operation.217  Additionally, the director of local government was to 
approve and supervise unit budgets for as long as necessary.218 
In 1936, there was a large change to local-government finance that 
fundamentally changed the LGC’s role.  A constitutional amendment was 
passed that, in effect, required that “95% of all bond issues (other than funding 
and refunding issues) . . . be approved by the voters” of an issuing local 
government unit.219  This led the LGC to act as more of an advisor than an 
approver of debt, since the General Assembly made clear that voters were to 
be the final decision-makers when local governments were considering the 
authorization of new debt.220 
In spite of the changes, the LGC was very successful during this period 
in reducing the amount of debt incurred by local governments.  Total 
outstanding bond indebtedness reached a peak of $362 million in mid-1932, 
and a low of $241 million by mid-1946.221  Because of the strict nature of 
LGC oversight, local-government indebtedness decreased by more than $30 
million between 1931 and 1936.222  Upon undertaking a more advisory role 
 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 10. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 11. 
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after 1936, the LGC worked to proactively address potential defaults in the 
pre-issuance phase.223  The LGC also sold a number of bonds on behalf of 
local governments during this period, selling over $803 million in bonds over 
its first thirty years ($618 million of which was new debt).224  The LGC’s 
power to approve refinancing plans also paid dividends: at the peak of defaults 
in 1933, 62 counties, 152 cities and towns, and 200 districts had defaulted on 
their bonds.225  By 1942, only six small towns were still in default.226  The 
LGC also corrected problems with inadequate securitization of sinking fund 
assets and improper investments.227  Moreover, the LGC implemented controls 
over local audits and developed uniform systems of accounting during this 
period.228 
C. The Local Government Commission Today 
The LGC has changed considerably since the period of defaults that 
necessitated its existence.  Today there are three sections of the LGC: the 
Authorizations and Negotiated Bond Sales Section, the Competitive Bond 
Sales and State and Local Government Debt Records Section, and the Fiscal 
Management Section.229  The LGC underwent a significant restructuring in the 
1990s, primarily due to a proliferation of types of debt that went beyond 
traditional general obligation bonds.  These types included revenue bonds, 
special obligation bonds, and installment purchase financing.230  The LGC also 
handles industrial revenue bonds, issues for higher-education entities, and 
issues for private nonprofit hospitals.231 
In working with these transactions, the LGC holds a pre-issuing 
conference where the LGC discusses the appropriate debt instruments, capital 
plans, revenue streams, tax-collection rates, and other indicia of a unit’s ability 
to repay its proposed debt.232  The staff of the LGC is primarily involved in 
this stage of the negotiations, and the LGC itself ultimately decides whether or 
not the debt will be issued.233  The LGC also sells and markets the bonds 
 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 12–13. 
 225. Id. at 15. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 15–16. 
 228. Id. at 16–17. 
 229. See Carter, supra note 192, at 76. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 77. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
37
Parker: Positive Liberty in Public Finance: State Oversight of Local-Gove
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015
144 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:107 
through its Bond Sales Division, and then monitors the unit’s ability to repay 
the debt through its Fiscal Management Section.234 
The LGC’s influence has continued to prevent bond defaults in North 
Carolina.  Since 1942, after refinancing the Depression-era defaults, no local-
government unit has failed to meet a bond obligation.235  Further, all three 
ratings agencies that determine the creditworthiness of state- and local-
government bonds have provided North Carolina with consistently high 
ratings, stating that “North Carolina’s oversight model is one of the strongest 
of any state.”236 
Lastly, while the LGC prefers to act in an advisory role rather than a 
regulatory role,237 it has used its power to assume control of three towns’ 
finances: the Town of East Spencer in 2001,238 Enfield, and Princeville.239  
The LGC often avoids assuming control of a town’s finances by issuing 
warning letters to towns that are suffering from fiscal difficulties (as it has 
recently in the Town of Maxton, Scotland County, and Chowan County),240 
but the LGC has shown that it will take action if a town is in danger of 
defaulting on its debt. 
 
 234. Id. at 77–78. 
 235. See Fehr, supra note 29. 
 236. Id. (quoting Andrew Teras, an associate director of the Standard & Poor rating agency).  
This is in part because of a policy requiring high levels of fund balance (between 5% and 15%, 
with a recommended level of 8%).  Id. 
 237. See Carter, supra note 192, at 80. 
 238. See Fehr, supra note 29. 
 239. Mark Wineka, State Takes Control of East Spencer’s Finances, SALISBURY POST (Oct. 
24, 2001), https://web.archive.org/web/20061103042245/http://www.salisburypost.com/2001 
oct/102401m.htm.  Princeville remains in financial distress, and was taken over again in July 
2012.  See John Frank, Princeville Mayor Arrested on Embezzlement Charges, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/08/07/3089729_ princeville-
mayor-arrested-on.html?rh=1. 
 240. See Fehr, supra note 29 (noting that the former town manager overestimated revenue 
for several years and refused to cut expenditures after these errors were identified).  Leading 
officials in Maxton recently laid off two public safety employees and are currently considering 
what else should be done to return the town to solvency.  Id.  Scotland County received a 
warning letter when its fund balance fell from 9% to 6% in one year.  Id.  The LGC barred new 
debt issuances to Chowan County after several years of inaccurate revenue calculations.  Id. 
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III. POWERS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMISSION 
A. Approving Debt 
1.  The LGC’s Process for Approving Debt 
Approval of debt is one of the three primary missions of the LGC.241  
This is a unique proactive feature of the LGC compared to several other state-
oversight mechanisms.  As discussed earlier, there are at least two states that 
require local governments to obtain approval from a state administrative 
agency before allowing the local government to issue debt: Louisiana and 
North Carolina.242  Indiana is another state that may require approval by a state 
agency, but ten or more taxpayers must first file an objection to the local bond 
issue.243  Control boards also sprang up in the wake of the issues in Orange 
County, California, for specific jurisdictions.244 
The LGC differs in that it is legally responsible for the approval of nearly 
all local-government debt.245  There are several steps involved in the LGC’s 
 
 241. See About the Local Government Commission, N.C. DEP’T ST. TREASURER, http:// 
www.nctreasurer.com/slg/Pages/Local-Government-Commission.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 
2014).  The other two primary responsibilities of the LGC are marketing debt after approval and 
regulating the annual financial reporting done by local government units.  Id. 
 242. See LA. CONST. art. VI, pt. II, § 33; N.C. CONST. art. V, § 4(2); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 36:769, 36:802, 39:871 (2014) (requiring approval from the State Bond Commission, which 
is part of the Department of Treasury); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-172 (2013) (requiring all local-
government notes to be approved by the Local Government Commission before issuance); see 
also NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 350.0115, .014 (2011) (requiring prior approval from Debt 
Management Commission for the county in which local government is located). 
 243. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-20-6 (West 2010). 
 244. Barbara Flickinger & Katherine McManus, Bankruptcy Aftershocks: Have Public 
Finance Foundations Been Shaken?, PUB. MGMT., Jan. 1996, at 16, 2122 (discussing control 
boards in Washington, D.C., New York City, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Yonkers, Bridgeport, 
New Haven, and Chicago).  Indeed, when some of these cities gave up their finance and 
budgeting decisions to the control board, their debt ratings were positively affected.  Id. at 22.  
For a discussion of the difficulties faced by Orange County, California, see supra note 10 and 
accompanying text. 
 245. See Charles K. Coe, Preventing Local Government Fiscal Crises: The North Carolina 
Approach, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Fall 2007, at 39, 41.  This Article uses the term “nearly all” 
in the context of local-government debt because there are certain types of local-government 
debt that do not require the LGC’s approval, although Professor Coe cites to Professor David 
Lawrence’s text for the proposition that all North Carolina debt must be approved by the LGC.  
Id.  I did not read Professor Lawrence’s text to say that all North Carolina local government 
debt must be approved, but that most types of debt require LGC approval.  See LAWRENCE, 
supra note 8, § 400, at 93 (noting that the LGC “must review and approve most proposed 
borrowings by local governments, and the commission’s explicit concern is with the unit’s 
capacity to repay the proposed debt”).  Part III.A.2 provides a discussion of the types requiring 
approval. 
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approval of debt, but the majority of these considerations are not within the 
statute.246  The statutory-approval requirements of the LGC often overlap: for 
example, the statutory-approval mechanism of the LGC itself appears in 
sections 159-50 to -53 of the North Carolina General Statutes, as well as 
within the regulations promulgated by the state treasurer.247 
Before consideration of the local government’s debt approval, the LGC 
must first follow through on a number of basic steps.  With general obligation 
bonds, for example, the LGC first conducts a preliminary conference with the 
issuing local government unit to discuss the proposed debt issuance.248  The 
local government must then publish notice of its intent to apply to the LGC.249  
If the bond is for school construction, the school board or a board of trustees 
proposing to issue a school bond must adopt a resolution.250  If a local 
government is seeking to issue the bonds, the governing board must adopt a 
resolution.  The local unit then makes its application to the LGC.251 
Each individual bond type also has different metrics when being 
considered for approval, although there are overlaps within the process.  For 
example, when examining general obligation bonds, the statute provides that 
the LGC may consider the following factors: 
 
 Whether the undertaking is necessary or expedient. 
 The nature of the unit’s outstanding debt. 
 The unit’s debt management policies and procedures. 
 The unit’s tax and special assessment collection record. 
 The unit’s compliance with the Local Government Budget 
and Fiscal Control Act. 
 Whether the unit is in default on its debt obligations. 
 The unit’s present tax rates and necessary increases to pay its 
obligations. 
 The unit’s property values. 
 The ability of the unit to sustain additional taxes, if 
necessary. 
 
 246. The majority of the indicators used by the LGC are not within the statute.  See Kimhi, 
Reviving Cities, supra note 38, at 680 n.256.  The LGC’s seven indicators were developed by 
the staff of the organization.  See id. (“[T]he LGC uses the following types of indicators: three 
indicators examine the local revenues and expenditures, two examine the localities’ operating 
position, one examines unfunded liabilities, and one examines legal or technical violations.”). 
 247. See LAWRENCE, supra note 8, § 402A, at 95. 
 248. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-51 (2013). 
 249. Id. § 159-50. 
 250. Id. §§ 115C-503, -521. 
 251. Id. § 159-51. 
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 The ability of the Commission to market the proposed bonds 
at reasonable interest rates. 
 If the proposed contract is for utility or public service, what 
the net revenues of the undertaking will be. 
 Whether the amount of the proposed debt will be adequate to 
accomplish the purpose for which it is incurred. 
 If the proposed bond issue is for a water system, whether the 
unit has prepared a water supply plan.252 
 
The LGC is to approve the application if it can determine: 
 
 The proposed bond issue is necessary or expedient. 
 That the amount proposed is adequate and not excessive for 
the purpose. 
 That the unit’s debt management policies are sound and that 
the unit will meet its obligations. 
 That, if necessary, [any] increase in taxes to meet the 
contractual obligations will not be excessive. 
 That the proposed bonds can be marketed at reasonable rates 
of interest.253 
 
Approval for revenue bonds has a very similar type of approval structure, 
although it removes the language discussing sufficient tax revenues (revenue 
streams from the funded enterprise, rather than the taxing power, is the object 
of the pledge) and adds language regarding whether the proposed project is 
feasible.254  If the LGC approves the debt, the local government then 
undertakes formal steps to officially approve the debt, and may even conduct 
an election if a general obligation bond is under consideration.255 
 
 252. Id. § 159-52(a). 
 253. Id. § 159-52(b). 
 254. Id. § 159-161. 
 255. See id. § 159-54 (providing for a local government to set a hearing date for the bond 
issue); id. § 159-55 (requiring the local government to file a statement of debt with the clerk to 
the board); id. §§ 159-56 to -57 (requiring the local government to publish a bond order and 
notice of hearing); id. § 159-57 (requiring the local government to hold a public hearing and 
adopt a bond order); id. § 159-61 (requiring the local government to publish a notice of the 
referendum for a general obligation bond).  Sections 159-61, 163-182.5, and 163-302 provide 
for election requirements.  For a convenient chart of this process, see LAWRENCE, supra note 8, 
§ 202B, at 44–45. 
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2.  The Types of Debt that Require LGC Approval 
There are four types of local-government debt that always require LGC 
approval: general obligation bonds,256 revenue bonds,257 special obligation 
bonds,258 and project development financing bonds.259  Other types of debt 
financing typically, but do not always, require LGC approval.260  These 
include installment purchase debt,261 certain contracts relating to leases, the 
acquisition or construction of capital,262 and other financial arrangements.263 
 
 256. See N.C. CONST. art. V, § 4; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-43 to -79; see also id. §§ 159-160 
to -165, 159G-40. 
 257. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-210.1 to .7 (set to expire July 1, 2015); id. §§ 159-80 
to -97, -161; id. §§ 160A-239.1 to .7 (set to expire July 1, 2015). 
 258. See id. §§ 159-53, -86, -148, 159I-13, -15, -30.  Moreover, if there is an additional 
security pledged for the special obligation bond, it may be subject to LGC approval.  See id. 
§§ 159-148, 159I-30.  Section 159-148 requires LGC oversight if all of the following conditions 
are met: 
(1) [The bond contract] extends for five or more years from the date of the 
contract . . . . 
(2) [The bond contract] [o]bligates the unit to pay sums to another, without regard 
to whether the payee is a party to the contract. 
(3) [The bond contract] [o]bligates the unit over the full term of the contract, 
including periods that may be added to the original term through the exercise of 
options to renew or extend: 
 (a) For baseball park districts, to at least $500,000. 
 (b) For housing authorities, to at least $500,000 or a sum equal to $2,000 per 
housing unit owned and under active management by the housing authority, whichever 
is less. 
 (c) For other units, to at least $500,000 or . . . one tenth of [1%] of the assessed 
value of property subject to taxation by the contracting unit, whichever is less. 
(4) [The bond contract] [o]bligates the unit, expressly or by implication, to 
exercise its power to levy taxes either to make payments falling due under the 
contract, or to pay any judgment entered against the unit as a result of the unit’s breach 
of the contract. 
Id. § 159-148. 
 259. See N.C. CONST. art. V, § 14; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-48, -103, -105. 
 260. For a comprehensive blog post describing the different types of debt that require LGC 
approval, see Kara Millonzi, Local Government Commission (LGC) Approval of Contracts, 
Leases, and Other (Non-Debt) Financing Agreements, COATES’ CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L. 
BLOG (Aug. 9, 2012), http://canons.sog.unc.edu/?p=6786. 
 261. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-528, 115D-58.15, 159-148, -151, 160A-20; Wayne Cnty. 
Citizens Ass’n for Better Tax Control v. Wayne Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 399 S.E.2d 311, 313–14 
(N.C. 1991). 
 262. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-148. 
 263. Id.; see also id. §§ 159-153, 160A-20(e).  These include financings “whereby a local 
government entity approves or otherwise participates in the incurrence of indebtedness (or a 
similar financing arrangement) by another entity on the local government entity’s behalf.”  
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Installment purchase contracts must comply with the provisions 
contained in section 159-148 of the North Carolina General Statutes relating 
to contract length and amount before they are required to have LGC 
approval.264  Similarly, for contracts relating to lease, acquisition or capital 
construction projects, there are minimum thresholds for the amount of 
financing that is required before the debt needs LGC approval.265  Lastly, there 
are specific financing agreements exempted from LGC approval under 
section 160A-20(e) of the General Statutes regarding contracts with the 
federal and state governments, motor vehicle contracts, voting machine 
contracts, and loans with the North Carolina Solid Waste Management 
Program.266 
An urban redevelopment commission, administered by the local 
government, is another method by which a local government may issue debt 
without LGC approval.267  By statute, cities and counties may act as urban 
redevelopment commissions, which includes the ability to borrow money from 
federal, state, or local governments, or from any other source without being 
subject to approval by the LGC.268 
3.  The LGC’s Criteria for Approving Debt 
By statute, the LGC must consider the factors listed for each type of 
debt.269  These factors, however, are somewhat vague and leave a considerable 
amount of interpretation to the LGC staff.  The North Carolina Administrative 
 
Millonzi, supra note 260, at 3.  An example of this type is where a nonprofit corporation 
borrows money to construct a facility and then conveys the property to a local government at 
the end of a financing, which the government approves.  Id.  Section 153 also includes a “catch-
all provision” to cover future transactions that are similar to a local government borrowing 
money, but that are not explicitly listed in the statute.  Id. 
 264. For a discussion of the section 159-148 requirements, see supra note 258 and 
accompanying text. 
 265. Id. 
 266. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-148, -153, 160A-20(e). 
 267. Id. § 160A-505. 
 268. Id. §§ 160A-512(8), -516.  One reading of the North Carolina statutes is that if a local 
government acts as a redevelopment commission, it assumes the place of the redevelopment 
commission within the urban-redevelopment law under section 160A-505.  The local 
government, acting as a commission, could then issue debt under sections 160A-512(8) and 
160A-516 that is not subject to LGC approval.  Taken one step further, if the purposes of the 
urban-redevelopment law are defined broadly, a local government would have wide discretion 
in how it spends these funds.  The redevelopment commission may also provide several types of 
security for bonds, including a pledge of all gross rents, fees, and revenues, a mortgage on its 
property, future revenues, or other securities that make the bonds marketable.  Id. § 160A-517; 
see also DAVID M. LAWRENCE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LAW FOR NORTH CAROLINA LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS 80–81 (2000) (discussing this method of local-government financing). 
 269. See, e.g., supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
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Code provides some guidance concerning what the LGC will discuss with a 
local unit at its preliminary conference concerning debt obligations,270 along 
with requirements for all documents submitted to bond counsel in connection 
with the sale of these bonds.271 
There are many other internal processes used by the LGC to ensure that 
local governments maintain strong financial health.  The LGC’s staff places 
communities that are in the “worst fiscal shape” on a “watch list.”272  A key 
indicator used to determine these distinctions is fund balance, which is simply 
a level of reserves (or savings) maintained by a local government.273  The 
LGC requires 8% of operating expenses to be held in fund balance to protect 
against unanticipated events, like natural disasters or budgetary shortfalls, and 
the LGC will not approve a bond issue if fund balance is below that 
threshold.274  The LGC also sends letters to local governing boards to draw 
their attention to financial concerns as needed, and to provide assistance to 
local governments currently experiencing difficulties.275 
B. Marketing and Selling Debt 
The Competitive Bond Sales and State and Local Government Debt 
Records Section of the LGC helps to conduct all bond sales on behalf of local 
governments, which is especially beneficial for smaller local governments that 
might otherwise have difficulty budgeting their debt.276  This division handles 
the sale and delivery of competitively sold bonds, including the preparation of 
the “official statements,” which act as marketing tools for these debt 
instruments.277  Other states have a more extensive function in which they 
couple and sell debt in packages, also known as “pooling programs”;278 
 
 270. 20 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 3.0202(a) (2014).  That provision states that if a preliminary 
conference is held, it may include (1) “the proposed uses for proceeds of the bond issue,” (2) 
“the legality or appropriateness of the bond issue,” (3) “the adequacy of the accounting and 
internal control systems of the governmental unit,” (4) “the application procedure and the 
documents required,” and (5) any “other matters as the Secretary deems appropriate.”  Id. 
 271. Id. r. 3.0203. 
 272. See Fehr, supra note 29. 
 273. Id.  Note, however, that many local governments in North Carolina retain a fund 
balance greater than 8%.  Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See Coe, supra note 245, at 42–43. 
 276. See Carter, supra note 192, at 78. 
 277. Id.; see also Note, supra note 27, at 509–10 (describing the process of marketing local-
government debt). 
 278. See, e.g., Indiana Bond Bank: Pool Program, IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov/tos/bond/ 
2409.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (describing a “bond bank” in Indiana that assists smaller 
communities with long-term debt financing and requires projects larger than $100,000 to be 
designed as seven- to thirty-year financings). 
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however, this is not a current feature of the LGC (although it is a ripe 
consideration for a future addition to the LGC).279 
C. Auditing Debt 
Debt auditing is a common function across many states, and it remains a 
function of the LGC.280  The Local Government Budget and Fiscal Control 
Act requires that two reports are made to the LGC: (1) a report concerning the 
status of deposits and investments in the unit,281 and (2) the Annual Financial 
Information Report (sometimes also known as a Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Report, or a CAFR),282 which contains information that the LGC 
makes public,283 and which is also used by the LGC to determine whether any 
violations have occurred.284 
D. Removal and Takeover Provisions 
The LGC can order local governments to issue semiannual reports on 
deposits and investments.285  Additionally, the LGC can order a local 
government to appropriate additional funds to cover its debt-service 
obligations if the locality is behind in its payments.286  If the LGC finds faulty 
controls within a local government’s financial structure, it can also order 
improvements to certain processes.287 
 
 279. Another example can be found in Vermont, where the state operates the Vermont Bond 
Bank.  See VT. MUN. BOND BANK, http://www.vmbb.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
 280. Auditing functions are not as cut-and-dried as they might seem.  Facing fiscal distress, 
several local and state governments have engaged in practices that some argue are “gimmicks” 
to make a government’s balance sheet appear in better health than it truly is.  See generally 
Eileen Norcross, Fiscal Evasion in State Budgeting (Mercatus Ctr. at George Mason U., 
Working Paper No. 10-39, 2010), available at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication 
/Norcross.Fiscall%20Evasion.%20State%20Budget%20Gimmicks.%20Updated%208.23.10.pdf 
(describing the manifold issues that state governments encounter when auditing local 
governments). 
 281. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-33 (2013). 
 282. Id. § 159-33.1. 
 283. The local governments’ information is published on the State Treasurer’s website.  See 
Financial Analysis Tools and Reports, N.C. DEP’T ST. TREASURER, https://www.nctreasurer. 
com/slg/lfm/financial-analysis/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
 284. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-33.1; see also DAVID M. LAWRENCE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
FINANCE IN NORTH CAROLINA § 1202, at 242–43 (2d ed. 1990). 
 285. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-33. 
 286. Id. § 159-36. 
 287. Id. § 159-25(c).  Under section 159-25(c), 
  The [LGC] has authority to issue rules and regulations having the force of law 
governing procedures for the receipt, deposit, investment, transfer, and disbursement 
of money and other assets by units of local government and public authorities, may 
45
Parker: Positive Liberty in Public Finance: State Oversight of Local-Gove
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015
152 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:107 
Further, knowingly refusing to obey an LGC order may result in criminal 
penalties.288  The LGC may also remove individuals from office.289  
Additionally, if the local unit is not cooperative, the LGC may impound the 
entity’s financial records and assume control of its financial affairs.290  These 
standing takeover powers are a unique function of the LGC compared to other 
states’ oversight mechanisms, and while they are used sparingly, they have 
been exercised to avert financial crises in a small number (four) of local-
government entities.291  Finally, a local government cannot file for bankruptcy 
unless the LGC approves such a filing.292  Since the LGC began overseeing 
local-government debt, there has only been one filing by a nontraditional unit 
of government: the South Brunswick Water and Sewer Authority.293 
E. A Holistic Approach to Local-Government Debt Oversight 
The LGC is extensively involved at every step of the debt-approval 
process.  By design and through its administrative procedures, the LGC offers 
thoughtful, proactive regulation of local-government debt at every step of a 
local government’s budgetary process for debt management.  The LGC has 
built-in functions for continued oversight, including the ability to dictate a 
local government’s fiscal decisions if necessary.  The LGC staff evaluates 
debt before it is issued, considers financial statements and debt ratios while 
the debt is outstanding, and guides the debt issues to their eventual conclusion. 
The certainty surrounding the agency has created a form of “credit 
enhancement” for ratings agencies when they view North Carolina’s local-
government debt, and also provides a level of certainty for local governments 
to operate within.294  This is especially comforting to investors, as even the 
 
inquire into and investigate the internal control procedures of a local government or 
public authority, and may require any modifications in internal control procedures 
which, in the opinion of the [LGC], are necessary or desirable to prevent 
embezzlements or mishandling of public moneys. 
Id. 
 288. Id. § 159-181. 
 289. Id. § 159-182. 
 290. Id. § 159-181. 
 291. For example, the Town of Princeville has twice been taken over by the LGC and is 
currently being investigated for improper financial reporting.  See Beau Minnick, SBI 
Investigating Spending by Princeville Officials, WRAL.COM (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.wral. 
com/sbi-investigating-spending-by-princeville-officials/12316307/; Coe, supra note 245, at 
4445 (discussing four instances where the LGC assumed control over a local government: 
Princeville, Enfield, East Spencer, and the South Brunswick Water and Sewer Authority). 
 292. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 23-48. 
 293. See Voluntary Petition, In re S. Brunswick Water & Sewer Auth., No. 04-09053-8-JRL 
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2004). 
 294. See Fehr, supra note 29. 
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most secure forms of public debt—general obligation bonds—have recently 
faced uncertainty.295  The number of “emergencies” that the LGC has had to 
respond to have also been limited, as the LGC takes care of most instabilities 
on the front end by denying approval for debt or working with the local 
government in its preliminary conference.296  Laying out the ground rules for 
all local governments and imposing fiscal responsibility for their actions—as 
opposed to the vague notion that the state will bail the locality out if distress is 
great enough—creates an environment where political leaders take a higher 
level of responsibility for their financial decision-making. 
IV. RECENT CHANGES TO THE LGC AND OTHER POSSIBLE FUNCTIONS 
This Part considers the arguments for extension of the LGC’s authority 
into different areas, drawing upon specific examples in North Carolina.  
Additionally, this Part examines legislation passed by the General Assembly 
in 2013 that altered the LGC’s authority to assume control of water and sewer 
systems.  This Part also argues that delegating oversight to the LGC over 
pension funds, economic-development activities, and school boards is not 
appropriate for the LGC’s structure.  Specifically, this Part argues that state-
run investment funds gain little by applying a lateral level of oversight, that 
some decisions relating to economic development are political in nature and 
thus fall outside the scope of the LGC’s proper authority, and that revenue-
collection limitations within school boards make LGC control less practical 
and less effective.  Finally, this Part critiques a recent move by the LGC, in 
which it offered “guidelines” by imposing a categorical bar against certain 
types of debt financing, rather than adopting regulations or proposing 
legislation. 
 
 295. See NAT’L ASS’N BOND LAWYERS, GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS: STATE LAW, 
BANKRUPTCY AND DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS i (Aug. 2014), http://www.nabl.org/uploads/ 
cms/documents/GENERAL_OBLIGATION_MUNICIPAL_BONDS.pdf. The National 
Association of Bond Lawyers described this uncertainty surrounding general obligation bonds: 
Recent events, including the bankruptcy filings by Jefferson County, Alabama, and 
the City of Detroit, Michigan, have raised questions about the security of general 
obligation bonds and challenged the commonly held general assumptions [about 
general obligation bonds].  It has become apparent that all general obligations bonds 
do not enjoy the same security or the same remedies for enforcement of the promise 
to pay under state or local law.  Further, the treatment of general obligation bonds in 
a Chapter 9 bankruptcy case is uncertain and will depend on the security provided by 
applicable state law. 
Id. 
 296. See Fehr, supra note 29 (discussing the LGC’s denial of loan requests from the Town 
of Navassa, Scotland County, and Chowan County). 
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A. Recent Changes from 2013 and 2014 
In 2013, legislation was introduced to allow the LGC to assume control 
of a water/sewer enterprise if “for three consecutive fiscal years, the audited 
financial statements of the unit” had any of three conditions: (1) negative 
working capital; (2) a quick ratio of less than 1.0; or (3) the unit or public 
authority experienced a net loss of revenue.297  The LGC must find that the 
impacts of these three items, in tandem, create instability in the financial 
affairs of the unit and that the public authority or unit of government has failed 
to take corrective measures.298  Finally, the LGC must provide warnings and 
notice to any authority or unit of government lacking compliance under the 
statute.  This legislation passed without opposition in 2013.299 
A large concern regarding the new law is that the nature of an enterprise, 
such as a water/sewer entity, usually requires special expertise to 
administer.300  However, the new law concerns a utility that is typically 
operated by a local unit of government, or by a group of local governments 
through an interlocal agreement or other regional governmental entities.301  
One might assume that the ability to set rates, to rely on technical expertise of 
the water system’s staff, and the similarity in nature to a local government 
would make these types of governmental water authorities appropriate for 
LGC oversight.302 
 
 297. S.B. 207, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Sess. (N.C. 2013).  The bill provides that 
“‘working capital’ means current assets, such as cash, inventory, and accounts receivable, less 
current liabilities, determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and 
the phrase ‘quick ratio of less than 1.0’ means that the ratio of liquid assets, cash and 
receivables, to current liabilities is less than 1.0.”  Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Act of June 19, 2013, ch. 150, § 1, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 358, 358 (codified at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 159-181(d) (2013)). 
 300. For an example of the complexities that come with administering water- and 
wastewater-management systems, see Projects and Programs, UNC ENVTL. FIN. CTR., 
http://www.efc.sog.unc.edu/content/projects-and-programs (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) 
(discussing several considerations regarding rate structures, business models, irrigation policies, 
and more). 
 301. For a discussion of these regional water entities, see Shadi Eskaf, Tips on 
Regionalization: Crafting Interlocal Water Agreements and Water System Interconnections, 
UNC ENVTL. FIN. CTR. (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.efc.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.efc.sog.unc. 
edu/files/TipsforRegionalization_0.pdf.  Note that the private water systems would not be 
included in the proposed legislation.  See supra note 297 and accompanying text. 
 302. One other change from the General Assembly is that the LGC now also oversees loan 
applications from the State Department of Transportation from the infrastructure-banking 
program.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-18. 
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B. Pension Oversight by the LGC 
Oversight of pensions in North Carolina is handled entirely by the State 
Treasurer’s Office,303 of which the LGC is a part.  While pension obligation 
bonds are fraught with issues, both pension obligation bonds and the pension 
fund involve investment functions304 that an LGC-style organization is not 
suited to handle.  The LGC is essentially designed to audit, correct, and 
market local-government debt—the group is not an investment house designed 
to grow a portfolio.  Additionally, the state treasurer administers local-
government retirement benefits305 via an opt-in provision.306  Tasking the LGC 
with this oversight seems redundant and may create a conflict of interest307 
between two parts of the same statewide office.308  If a system is administered 
by the state, it may make sense for the federal government to oversee and 
impose requirements on pension systems to ensure solvency and to 
appropriate fund balances, benefits offered, and investment strategies.309 
 
 303. Get the Facts: The North Carolina Pension System, N.C. DEP’T ST. TREASURER 1, 
https://www.nctreasurer.com/ret/Active%20Employees/PensionFactSheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 
3, 2015) (noting that the North Carolina pension system “supports the more than 820,000 
current and former public employees in North Carolina” and that the “pension fund is managed 
by the North Carolina Department of State Treasurer”).  The fund is $72.4 billion in size and is 
the fourteenth largest in the United States, as well as the thirty-second largest in the world.  Id. 
 304. See Eric Schulzke, Pension Obligation Bonds: Risky Gimmick or Smart Investment?, 
GOVERNING (Jan. 2013), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-workforce/pensions/gov-
pension-obligation-bonds-risky-or-smart.html (“[Pension obligation bonds] are a financing 
maneuver that allows states and local governments to ‘wipe out’ unfunded pension liabilities by 
borrowing against future tax revenue, then investing the proceeds in equities or other high-yield 
investments.”).  Schulzke asserts that pension obligation bonds “have bankrupted whole cities.”  
Id. 
 305. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 128-21 to -38.10. 
 306. Id. § 128-33. 
 307. But cf. 2 CONIGLIO & GELFAND, supra note 19, § 12:13, at 12-53 to -55 (discussing 
state oversight of state bonds and notes). 
 308. This is not to say that there should be no state assistance and oversight where local 
governments administer their own pension system.  For examples of how some local 
governments have mismanaged pension funds, see Schulzke, supra note 304 (describing two 
California cities that issued overly generous pensions and subsequently went bankrupt). 
 309. See generally Allan Beckmann, Pension Obligation Bonds: Are States and Localities 
Behaving Themselves or Do the Feds Need to Get Involved? (Spring 2010) (unpublished 
M.P.A. capstone paper, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), available at http:// 
www.mpa.unc.edu/sites/www.mpa.unc.edu/files/AllanBeckmann.pdf (arguing that the federal 
government should coordinate with the Government Finance Officers Association to encourage 
states issuing pension obligation bonds to follow “best practices” and to consider whether 
current regulations are appropriate).  Indeed, some convincingly argue that pension obligations 
in certain states have led to increased costs of borrowing for states and local governments due to 
the strength of public sector employee unions.  See Peterson & Nadler, supra note 5, at 26468. 
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C. Oversight of School Finance 
Unsuccessful legislation was offered to provide local school districts in 
North Carolina with the ability to impose property taxes, and also for the LGC 
to oversee how those local school districts spent their revenues.310  A local 
school district would be more analogous to a local unit of government if it 
possessed the statutory authority to impose taxes.  In their current form, 
however, North Carolina schools do not possess this power.311  The LGC 
model is an improper fit for North Carolina schools as they currently operate 
because a forced takeover of a school district would not bring with it the 
ability to raise revenues and decrease expenditures.312 
This lack of flexibility would give the LGC only one tool to balance a 
school system’s budget in the event the county or state fails to supply more 
property tax funds of their own volition—to cut expenses.  This also puts the 
LGC squarely into a political fight, whereby it will have to lobby another 
board for funds to solve a fiscal crisis.  One only need look to the early 
examples in Florida for a worst-case scenario of that conversation.313 
D. LGC Oversight of Economic-Development Activities 
Others call for the LGC to have greater oversight authority over 
economic-development activities of local governments.314  Supporters of this 
suggestion, which particularly target tax increment financing (TIF) within 
North Carolina as an area for greater LGC oversight, want the LGC to 
 
 310. See H.B. 955, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Sess. (N.C. 2013) (referred to the H. 
Comm. on Rules, Calendar, and Operations of the House two days after the bill was filed, with 
no further action taken during the remainder of the 2013-2014 Session). 
 311. See T. Keung Hui, N.C. Bill Would Block School Boards from Suing County 
Commissioners for More Money, NEWS & OBSERVER (Apr. 21, 2013), http://www. 
newsobserver.com/2013/04/21/2841341/nc-bill-would-block-school-boards.html (“North 
Carolina school districts don’t have taxing authority so they request money from their county 
board of commissioners for facility needs.  School boards also ask commissioners to 
supplement amounts they get from the state and federal government for day-to-day needs in the 
operating budget.”). 
 312. Some support providing school districts with taxing authority because it would make 
the school accountable for its policy choices.  See Renee Chou, Calls Grow to Give School 
Boards Taxing Authority, WRAL.COM (Mar. 21, 2008), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/ 
2614055/. 
 313. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 314. JOHN LOCKE FOUND., SPOTLIGHT NO. 350, COMMON-SENSE TIF REFORMS 1–3 (May 28, 
2008), http://www.johnlocke.org/acrobat/spotlights/spotlight-350-tifreforms.pdf (calling for 
greater oversight by the LGC regarding the feasibility of projects). 
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examine the feasibility of the project, along with the other traditional indicia 
of financial solvency that the LGC uses.315 
The problem with this approach is that these reforms essentially ask the 
LGC to wade into political waters: rather than simply determining whether a 
project is financially feasible, the LGC is being asked to determine whether a 
project is advisable.  While the LGC may already informally remark on the 
wisdom of such projects, asking the LGC to deny local-government debt when 
it has sufficient assurances that the debt will be paid off defeats the purpose of 
the organization. If the LGC is meant to keep local governments from 
defaulting on their debt obligations, thereby keeping debt service rates low for 
all local governments, it has done its job in areas such as Roanoke Rapids, 
which is often held up as a reason to adjust the LGC structure in North 
Carolina.316 
Going beyond the LGC’s purpose to prohibit financially sound debt-
management schemes based on whether or not the LGC agrees with the 
purported use of the debt is a step too far, and it restricts local governments’ 
abilities to finance new projects on the basis of normative judgments made by 
an unelected arm of a state agency.317  Rather, local governing boards and the 
General Assembly—not the LGC—are better suited to weigh the advisability 
of a proposed project. 
In other words, this approach exerts too much positive liberty at the 
expense of local-government flexibility, or negative liberty.  Incentives, 
unwise development projects, and successful forms of economic development 
do not necessarily impact the ability of other governments to provide their 
own incentives or to engage in debt financing to spur economic development 
 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id.  For a discussion of the Roanoke Rapids TIF in North Carolina, see Adam C. 
Parker, Comment, Still as Moonlight: Why Tax Increment Financing Stalled in North Carolina, 
91 N.C. L. REV. 661, 697700 (2013).  Roanoke Rapids has experienced significant difficulties 
with its TIF structure since the initial theater tenant, Randy Parton and the Moonlight Bandits, 
were dismissed from their managerial duties.  Id. at 663.  Multiple attempts to sell the theater 
failed, although the town has now successfully partnered with a tenant for two years who also 
intends to purchase the theater from the city.  See Khai Hoang, City, HSV Entertainment Strike 
New Lease Agreement on Theater, DAILY HERALD (Roanoke Rapids, N.C.) (July 4, 2014, 6:00 
AM), http://www.rrdailyherald.com/news/city-hsv-entertainment-strike-new-lease-agreement-
on-theater/article_a03f5460-030f-11e4-890c-001a4bcf887a.html. 
 317. One may argue that because the state treasurer is elected, this point about an unelected 
body making decisions for an elected local-government board is moot.  Ultimately, denying 
financing based on personal preference and “best judgment” seems to violate the state 
treasurer’s functions and core purposes in this area, which involve the issuance and monitoring 
of all local-government debt, including the amount of debt.  See State and Local Government: 
Local Debt, N.C. DEP’T ST. TREASURER, http://www.nctreasurer.com/slg/Pages/Local-Debt.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
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as long as there are no defaults or bankruptcies.  If anything, a local 
government’s fiscal decisions—good or bad—will offer a competitive 
advantage to surrounding governments by spurring neighboring localities of 
prosperous units to achieve the same prosperity or by granting a competitive 
edge to neighboring localities of units suffering from unwise fiscal planning. 
E. One Area of Criticism 
For a number of years, the LGC has operated in a space where it enjoyed 
the administrative flexibility to approve or disapprove debt without offering 
public statements explaining its decision.318  Rather than approving 
administrative regulations through rulemaking or other legislative processes, 
the LGC worked with units informally or issued “guidelines” about local-
government practices.319 
Recently, the LGC has put forth additional “guidelines” (which are in 
effect more similar to codified “rules”) to advise bond attorneys and local 
governments about its decision-making process.320  Even so, the LGC has not 
yet engaged in a rulemaking proceeding, which it is likely required to do if the 
LGC intends for these “guidelines” to have any legal effect.321  Additionally, 
some of these policies have been enforced in a non-uniform way, particularly 
within the area of refinancing debt initially purchased by the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA).322  Despite its informal method of 
 
 318. See Note, supra note 27, at 498–99 (noting that the LGC could approve or disapprove 
debt under thirteen broad bases, and that approval was often, in practice, determined via an 
informal conference before the full-commission vote).  The ability to override the LGC was also 
unlikely to be successful, as a sale of bonds disapproved of by the LGC was likely to be seen as 
less marketable.  Id. at 499–500. 
 319. See, e.g., Guidelines on Debt Issuance (Revised), N.C. DEP’T ST. TREASURER (Mar. 27, 
2007), https://www.nctreasurer.com/slg/Debt%20Management/GuidelinesforDebtIssuanceFinal 
2.pdf. 
 320. See Bob Jessup, The LGC’s Proposed Maturity Guidelines Are Unfair, N.C. PUB. FIN. 
(Feb. 24, 2014), http://ncpublicfinance.com/2014/02/24/the-lgcs-proposed-maturity-guidelines-
are-unfair/. 
 321. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(8a) (2013) (“‘Rule’ means any . . . statement of general 
applicability . . . that describes the procedure or practice requirements of an agency.”). 
 322. See Bob Jessup, An Update on the LGC Maturity Guidelines Project—Still No Freedom 
to Refund, N.C. PUB. FIN. (June 6, 2014), http://ncpublicfinance.com/2014/06/06/ an-update-on-
the-lgc-maturity-guidelines-project-still-no-freedom-to-refund/ (noting that eighteen months 
after announcing the guideline that encourages local governments not to apply for refinancing 
of USDA debt, the Town of Tabor City had that exact type of financing approved, despite 
others being denied due to the “guideline”).  This particular debate has even led to a bit of 
“forum-shopping” with LGC staffers, as Jessup notes: “Some outside the LGC have suggested 
that you may be able to get these applications approved if you send the material to the right 
staffer and don’t mention a conflict with the guidelines.  I think we can all agree that’s no way 
for the system to operate.”  Id. 
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administration, the LGC’s relationship with local governments remains 
important because the LGC approves and helps to market local-government 
debt, which perhaps lessens the local governments’ appetites to draw the LGC 
into litigation. 
Nonetheless, although a rulemaking process may prove cumbersome or 
onerous to pass into legislation, the LGC should engage in a formalized 
process.  The alternative is to keep administrative discretion in the hands of 
the LGC staff, enabling them to determine whether a project is feasible on a 
case-by-case basis by weighing the useful life of an asset, realized savings, 
costs of financing, and other relevant factors. 
The creation of “guidelines” with non-uniform enforcement is effectively 
neither of these options and should be discontinued.  It seems unlikely that a 
local government would litigate this matter for two reasons.  First, all local 
governments have an interest in maintaining a positive relationship with the 
LGC.  After all, the LGC determines whether it will approve a local 
government’s debt and also helps market their debt.  Additionally, the cost 
savings from such a refinancing may not be worth the litigation hassle or 
expense.  USDA financings are constrained to low-population areas and have 
extended repayment periods so that rural units can afford the project.323  This 
is another way to say that the units that could least afford to litigate the issue 
are the units affected by the guideline. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article proposes a simple solution to a mounting problem of local-
government fiscal insolvency in the United States.324  It supports the 
nationwide application of the multifaceted approach taken by North Carolina’s 
Local Government Commission, but only as long as the application does not 
extend its reach further than necessary to non-taxing governmental authorities 
or to the use of economic-development incentives. 
 
  These guidelines are fairly new and well intentioned.  However, a statute that says the 
LGC will not approve state refinancing of USDA debt would be a much better vehicle and 
would remove ambiguity regarding the “guideline.”  One need only look to the LGC’s success 
in gaining oversight of water-sewer systems, which included definitions of “quick ratios” and 
other financial indicators, in allowing the LGC to assume control of near-insolvent water and 
sewer systems.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-181.  The legislation granting this new authority passed 
without a single vote against the bill.  Senate Bill 207/S.L. 2013-150: Maintaining Water and 
Sewer Fiscal Health, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp 
/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2013&BillID=S207 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
 323. See Water and Waste Disposal Guaranteed Loans, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., http:// 
www.rurdev.usda.gov/UWP-dispguaranteedloan.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
 324. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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Exerting state control at the expense of local governments is 
extraordinarily difficult and comes with political hurdles, but North Carolina’s 
experience has shown that such a system keeps local-government interest rates 
low and helps avert fiscal crises.  However, as this Article also explains, there 
is a limit to the control that states should exert in these matters: local 
governments need the flexibility to make decisions to positively affect their 
communities.  If a local government wishes to take on debt, it should also be 
allowed to do so, as long as the local-government unit has both the political 
will and financial capability—not necessarily because the project is popular in 
the rest of the state.  The current structure of the LGC provides what this 
Article argues is a useful model for other states to emulate. 
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